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Chapter 1
Introduction
With the development of information technology, market channels have changed
drastically over the last few decades. For example, buyers and sellers can in-
teract and trade online (e.g., Amazon, eBay, etc). Some content including
music, movies, and books are digitized for download through the Internet
(e.g., iTunes, Kindle store, etc). Rochet and Tirole (2003) refer to these
business models as two-sided markets. Rochet and Tirole (2006) defines
two-sided markets as markets in which one or several platforms enable in-
teractions between end-users and try to get the two (or multiple) sides “on
board” by appropriately charging each side. Examples include credit cards,
shopping malls, video games, and digital content, among others. Most im-
portant feature of two-sided markets is that there exist indirect network
externalities across users on different sides of the platform; i.e., the benefits
enjoyed by the users on one side depend on the number of users on the other
side. For instance, in video game industry, the larger the number of software
developers, the greater benefit consumers can derive. Similarly, the larger
the number of consumers, the greater the profit that software developers can
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earn. Recently, two-sided markets have attracted much attention from not
only academics, but also practitioners.
Since the seminal works of Caillaud and Jullien (2003) and Rochet and
Tirole (2003), two-sided market has been investigated by many researchers.
Rochet and Tirole (2003) builds a model of platform competition to under-
stand the price allocation between the two sides of the market. Caillaud
and Jullien (2003) analyzed a model of competition between intermediation
service providers with indirect network externalities. They consider the ho-
mogeneous agents on both sides. In the case where all agents can participate
only one platform (single-home), all agents participate the same platform.
This equilibrium is efficient and always exists. However, inefficient equilibria
also exist. They also characterize the divide-and-conquer strategies, where
agents on one side are subsidized and profits are made by agents on the other
side. In contrast to Caillaud and Jullien (2003), Armstrong (2006) assumes
that consumers on both sides are heterogeneous. He shows that, when all
agents single-home, the equilibrium prices are determined by the elasticity
of participation and the external benefit to the agents on the other side.
Therefore, it is optimal to subsidize the agents who benefit the agents on the
other side in order to increase the number of transactions on the platforms.
On the other hand, he also considers a model of “competitive bottlenecks”
where agents on one side can participate in both platforms (multi-home). In
this case, the platforms have monopoly market powers for the agents on the
multi-homing side because the agents on the multi-homing side must deal
with the platforms to interact the agents on the single-homing side. There-
fore, platforms compete for the agents on the single-homing side and then
make the most profit from the agents on the multi-homing side.
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However, these papers does not consider the intra-platform competition.
Hagiu (2009) focuses on this aspect. He considers the consumers who prefer
variety to model the platform adoption problem by sellers. Weyl (2010) also
regards the users’ preferences for variety to develop the general non-linear
pricing model by the monopoly platform, so-called insulating tariffs.
According to Weyl (2010), there are two important features of two-sided
markets. First, platforms can set different uniform prices for buyers and
sellers. For example, in the video game industry, a platform sets a price
of video game consoles for consumers and a participation fee for software
developers. Second, there exist indirect network externalities across users
on different sides of the platform; i.e., the benefits enjoyed by the users on
one side depend on the number of users on the other side. For instance, the
larger the number of software developers, the greater benefit consumers can
derive. Similarly, the larger the number of consumers, the greater the profit
that software developers can earn.
Platforms charge prices for each side taking into account indirect net-
work externalities. As noted above, there has been considerable research on
two-sided pricing (Caillaud and Jullien, 2003; Rochet and Tirole, 2003, 2006;
Armstrong, 2006; Hagiu, 2009; Weyl, 2010). However, little has been re-
ported on strategies other than pricing strategies. This dissertation focuses
on hardware/software system platforms in particular. That is, a platform
sells its hardware device (e.g., video game console, mobile music player, e-
book reader, etc) to consumers and operates its software market (e.g., game
titles, digital music, e-books, etc). The software developers are charged the
license fee by the platform. We analyze the platforms’ strategies with re-
gard to compatibility and innovation, which play a critical role in the hard-
3
ware/software industries.
Compatibility is one of the most important strategies for digital content
markets. Compatibility involves opening the software (application) market
to users on rival platforms, which means that a platform provides a con-
verter (also known as translator, emulator, or adapter) that enables users of
other hardware devices to use content (application software) that the plat-
form supplies in its marketplace. For example, in the electronic book reader
industry, Amazon has adopted compatibility and opened its e-book market
(Kindle store) to users who own an Apple iPad. However, Apple does not
allow the users of Amazon’s Kindle to access iTunes or purchase e-books
provided for iPad users. Thus, Apple chooses incompatibility. The advan-
tage of compatibility is that a platform can increase its royalty revenue from
software developers because more consumers purchase the software in its soft-
ware market. On the other hand, the disadvantage of compatibility is that
it increases the attractiveness of the rival’s hardware device through a wider
availability of content. Therefore, compatibility is chosen by the platforms
that consider royalty revenue from software sales to be the major profit cen-
ter. Incompatibility is chosen by the platforms that consider hardware sales
to be the major profit center.
Platforms’ investment in innovation is also a strategy that depends on the
nature of their major profit center. This dissertation focuses on two types
of innovation for hardware devices that platforms sell to consumers: process
and product innovation. Process innovation refers to increased efficiency of
cost-reducing investment. Product innovation refers to improvements in the
quality of hardware devices. Platforms that focus on the hardware market
have greater incentives to invest in these innovations.
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The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter 2,
we show how compatibility decisions change over the product life cycle. In
Chapter 3, we investigate the relationship between compatibility decision and
process innovation. Chapter 4 focuses on the competition between vertically
differentiated platforms and demonstrates the advantages and disadvantages
of a high-quality. Chapter 5 summarizes the key findings and concludes the
paper by providing directions for further research.
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Chapter 2
Compatibility and the Product
Life Cycle in Two-Sided
Markets
2.1 Introduction
We consider a duopoly model with two competing platforms each of whom
chooses whether to make its content compatible with the rival’s hardware
device. Our main result is that the outcome of these choices depends on the
stage of the product life cycle in the industry. Specifically, at the early stage
of the product life cycle firms derive most of their profit from the sale of the
hardware devices because few customers will have yet purchased them. At
this early stage, making content compatible with the rival’s hardware device
is unprofitable because it increases the attractiveness of the rival’s hardware
device by wider availability of content. Therefore, incompatibility is the
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dominant strategy. But at a mature stage of the product life cycle, many
customers already own hardware devices and royalties from the sale of con-
tent will have become the major profit center. At the mature stage, making
content compatible with the rival’s hardware device is the dominant strat-
egy because it supports a wider demand for the content the firm is selling.
These results are derived in a stylized model in which the subgame-perfect
equilibrium attains one of five possible configurations depending on param-
eters. Asymmetric equilibria arise when the platform is at an intermediate
stage of the product life cycle and there is a large difference of market shares
for installed customer base, so that the large firm chooses to make its con-
tent incompatible with the other’s hardware while the small rival does the
opposite.
The sort of example we have in mind is that of an electronic book reader
such as the Amazon Kindle or Apple iPad tablet computer and the electronic
books that are viewed on these devices. Amazon has chosen to make its
electronic “Kindle” books compatible with the iPad tablet computer. While
Apple has so far not made its “iBooks” compatible with the Amazon Kindle.
Other instances of hardware devices and related content include audio or
video players that can but need not be outfitted with a converter, translator,
emulator, adapter, or gizmo supplied by a rival that makes the content of
the rival compatible with the device.
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2.2 Related literature
The seminal research on compatibility with rival’s products focused on net-
work effects.1 For example the value of a telephone network to any user
becomes greater, the larger the number of other users. If subscribers to the
telephone service of one supplier are able to call subscribers to rival telephone
services, then subscriptions to either service are more valued. These network
effects are called “direct network externalities”. Katz and Shapiro (1985)
showed that direct network externalities incline the largest incumbent sup-
plier against making its service compatible with the service of rivals. Cre´mer
et al. (2000) adapted the model of Katz and Shapiro (1985) to incorporate
locked-in, installed base customers who will not switch to other firms. They
showed that a firm with a large installed base prefers to reduce the degree of
compatibility with its smaller rivals. Malueg and Schwartz (2006) extended
the model of Cre´mer et al. (2000) to the case in which the largest firm faces
any number of small rivals and the incompatibility could produce tipping
(all new customers join one network). They showed that a firm with a large
installed base is likely to gain from compatibility in growing industries, but
not in relatively mature industries. All of this literature studies the issue
of compatibility between competitors in settings with single-sided platforms
and direct network externalities.
The research on product compatibility most closely related to our model
focuses on the strategic aspects of compatibility with complementary prod-
ucts. Matutes and Regibeau (1988, 1992) and Economides (1989) provided
1See Gilbert (1992), Katz and Shapiro (1994), Economides and White (1994), Econo-
mides (1996), Farrell and Klemperer (2007), and Shy (2011) for surveys on network effects
and compatibility.
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the mix and match framework for analysis of compatibility with rival com-
plementary products in a single-sided market without network externalities.
The main concern in those papers, and in this one, is not the size of the net-
work that confers consumer benefits when the supplier chooses compatibility,
but the wider availability of complementary products. These network effects
are called “indirect network externalities”. Our model extends the concept
of compatibility with rival complementary products to the case of competing
platforms in two-sided markets. Rochet and Tirole (2003) and Armstrong
(2006), among others, developed the basic analysis of two-sided markets, de-
fined as any in which a supplier’s sales to one set of demanders also affects
its income from a different set of demanders.2 So for instance an internet
platform provider supplies services to its users, and the number of such users
also affects the sale of internet advertising by the same platform provider.
In our framework, the competing platforms supply hardware devices (e-book
readers) and the number of users of the devices also affects the income from
royalties collected from original copyright holders of the content supplied for
use with the devices.
There have been a number of papers that address the issue of compat-
ibility in two-sided markets. Doganoglu and Wright (2006) examined the
effect of consumers’ multi-homing on compatibility between networks. They
showed that platforms have an insufficient incentive to choose compatibil-
ity in the presence of multi-homing. Miao (2009) developed the model of
two-sided markets and showed that a monopoly platform has an incentive to
2See also the seminal papers by Caillaud and Jullien (2003), Rochet and Tirole (2006),
and Armstrong and Wright (2007). For surveys on two-sided markets, see Roson (2005)
and Rysman (2009).
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foreclose competition in the complementary market by committing to main-
tain incompatibility. Casadesus-Masanell and Ruiz-Aliseda (2008) examined
the case of duopoly. They show that incompatibility gives rise to the situation
in which a dominant platform earns more than under compatibility. Viecens
(2011) examined platform competition under the assumption that the degree
of application compatibility is an exogenous parameter and showed that a
small firm will always demand that application compatibility be enforced but
a large firm never will.
In sum, contrary to the previous literature that focuses on competition
given the structure of compatibility, the unique theoretical contribution of our
work lies in showing the equilibrium structure of application compatibility
in a two-sided market with indirect network externalities. To the best of our
knowledge, this chapter is the first one which shows the interesting point that
the equilibrium structure of compatibility changes over the product life cycle,
and we will provide the example of the market for electronic book readers
such as those of Amazon and Apple which matches this theoretical result.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.3, we
develop the simplest possible model of compatibility decisions by platforms
in the two-sided markets. Section 2.4 presents the equilibrium outcomes of
subgames and comparative static analyses. Section 2.5 derives the subgame-
perfect equilibrium. Section 2.6 extends the basic model and Section 2.7
summarizes the key findings and concludes the chapter by providing direc-
tions for further research.
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2.3 Model
2.3.1 Platforms
Suppose that there are two platforms, i = 1, 2. Each platform provides a
hardware device i at a price pi and operates its marketplace i that distributes
content for its own hardware device. We consider that there are two kinds of
content, i = 1, 2, and that content i is exclusively supplied to marketplace i at
price ρi by the independent content provider and is designed to work only on
hardware device i.3 We suppose that each platform chooses whether to make
its content compatible with the other’s hardware device. In this chapter we
use the term application compatibility, which means that a platform provides
a converter (also known as translator, emulator, or adapter) which enables
users of other hardware devices to use content (application software) that it
supplies in its marketplace.4 We assume that each unit of content provides an
equal benefit for any consumer, and that the price of a unit of content is the
same for any content, ρi = ρ (i = 1, 2). Each platform charges a royalty rate
r (0 ≤ r ≤ 1) for each unit of content sold at its marketplace. Platforms also
earn revenue by selling their hardware devices to consumers. We treat the
price of content ρ and royalty rate r as exogenous variables in our basic model.
3It is assumed that contents available on the two platforms are mutually exclusive. In
reality, however, there are common contents supplied to several platforms (e.g. Amazon
and Apple have a large overlap in their selection of e-books). Even when we relax this
assumption and allow n kinds of common contents between two platforms in addition to
exclusive contents, we can demonstrate the results qualitatively similar to those described
in the propositions in Section 2.5. Proof is available upon request.
4Farrell and Saloner (1992) study the economics of“converters”in single-sided markets
with direct network externalities.
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In Section 2.6, we relax this assumption and endogenize the determination
of content price ρ, and show that our basic insights continue to hold. The
assumption of a common fixed royalty rate is somewhat unusual, but is true
for the electronic book (e-book) industry. The owners of digital contents, in
other word book publishers, adopt the agency pricing model. They set the
prices of their e-books, and distributors, like Amazon and Apple, get a fixed
percentage fee from the publishers for every book sold (about 30%) Jiang
(2012); Knowledge@Wharton (2012).
The profit function of platform i is given by
pii = rρdi + piDi, i = 1, 2,
where di denotes the demand for content supplied at marketplace i and Di
denotes the demand for the hardware device. We assume a constant marginal
cost of supplying hardware devices which is normalized to zero.
2.3.2 Consumers
We consider two groups of consumers: existing customers (the installed cus-
tomer base of each platform), and new customers. The mass of consumers is
normalized to 1. Denote by α the fraction of the consumers who are exist-
ing customers and by 1 − α the remaining fraction who are new customers.
Further stipulate that the fraction β of the existing customers have adopted
hardware device 1 and the remaining fraction 1− β customers have adopted
hardware device 2 in the previous period. These customers are the installed
bases of the platforms. While the existing customers already own hardware
devices and hence only demand content, new customers must buy both hard-
ware devices and content. Platforms compete to add new customers to their
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installed bases.
To analyze the consumers’ choice of platform, we use a Hotelling model
of product differentiation. The hardware devices are differentiated along the
unit interval [0, 1], with hardware 1 located at 0, and hardware 2 at 1. Each
new customer buys one hardware device only. Ideal points of consumers
are distributed uniformly on the unit interval with a unit density, and each
consumer incurs a constant proportional disutility t per unit length. We
assume that the benefit derived from consumption of the hardware device
(that is, the consumer’s stand-alone valuation for the hardware device) v is
large enough for every new customer to buy one hardware device. Denote
by B the utility that any consumer derives from a unit of content, which is
assumed to be the same for any content and for any consumer, and satisfies
the condition B > ρ. Thus, we consider that each consumer buys any usable
content.
The utility function of a new customer who is located at x, buys a hard-
ware device i, and uses its available contents is written as
ui = Ni(B − ρ) + v − pi − t|x− xi|,
where Ni is the amount of available content for hardware device i (Ni = 1, 2),
and xi is the location of hardware device i. We will use the notation, b =
B − ρ.
2.3.3 Game structure
We consider a two-stage game. In stage one, the two platforms independently
and simultaneously choose between application compatibility and incompat-
ibility. In stage two, platforms independently and simultaneously set their
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hardware prices p1 and p2. Then existing customers purchase content, and
new customers purchase both hardware and content.
The model is a one-period and static game, but we focus on the equilib-
rium of compatibility choices of platforms in different stages of the product
life cycle. We use α (the fraction of existing customers) as a measure of the
product life cycle in the industry. If α is large, almost all customers have
purchased hardware devices, and this industry is in the mature stage of the
product life cycle. Otherwise, if α is small, the industry is in the introductory
stage of the product life cycle.
2.4 Equilibrium and comparative statics
Given the compatibility decisions in stage one, it follows that there are four
possible market structures. The first is one of incompatible platforms in
which both platforms choose incompatibility, (IC, IC). The second is one of
compatible platforms in which both platforms choose compatibility, (C, C).
And the third and fourth are asymmetric market structures in which one
platform chooses incompatibility and the other chooses compatibility, (IC,
C) and (C, IC). For example, Figure 2.1 illustrates the asymmetric market
structure in which firm 1 chooses incompatibility and firm 2 compatibility. In
this section, we will derive the equilibrium prices, demands, profits, consumer
surplus, and social surplus under the various market structures.
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Figure 2.1: Market structure in which firm 2 has chosen compatibility, but
firm 1 has chosen incompatibility.
2.4.1 Incompatible platforms
In this case, for each hardware device, only a single content is available . The
utility function of a new customer who is located at x can be written as
ui = b+ v − pi − t|x− xi|, (i = 1, 2).
Let xˆ be the location of a new customer who is indifferent between the two
hardware devices, and thus it equals the proportion of consumers who buy
hardware 1:
u1 = u2 ⇒ xˆ =
t− p1 + p2
2t
.
Hence, the demand for hardware device i is
Di =
(t− pi + pj)(1− α)
2t
(i = 1, 2, j ̸= i).
Platform 1 maximizes its profit
pi1 = rρ(D1 + αβ) + p1D1 =
(p1 + rρ)(t− p1 + p2)(1− α)
2t
+ αβrρ
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with respect to its hardware price p1. Similarly, platform 2 maximizes its
profit
pi2 = rρ(D2 + α(1− β)) + p2D2 =
(p2 + rρ)(t− p2 + p1)(1− α)
2t
+ α(1− β)rρ
with respect to its hardware price p2. Taking the first-order conditions and
solving for prices, we have the equilibrium prices as follows:
p1(IC, IC) = p2(IC, IC) = t− rρ.
We can derive the equilibrium demands, profits, consumer surplus, and social
surplus as shown in Table 1.
2.4.2 Compatible platforms
When both platforms choose compatibility, all content is usable on either
hardware device. In this case, the utility function of a new customer is
ui = 2b+ v − pi − t|x− xi|, (i = 1, 2).
From this we can derive the demand for hardware as follows:
Di =
(t− pi + pj)(1− α)
2t
(i = 1, 2, j ̸= i).
The profit function of platform i is
pii = rρ+ piDi =
pi(t− pi + pj)(1− α)
2t
+ rρ (i = 1, 2, j ̸= i).
From the first-order conditions for profit maximization, we have the equilib-
rium hardware prices, demands, profits, consumer surplus, and social surplus
as shown in Table 2.1.
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2.4.3 Incompatible-compatible platforms
When platform 1 chooses incompatibility and platform 2 chooses compati-
bility, all content is usable with hardware device 1, but only content supplied
by firm 2 is usable with hardware device 2. In this case, the utility functions
of new customers are⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
u1 = 2b+ v − p1 − tx
u2 = b+ v − p2 − t(1− x).
From these we can derive the demands for hardware devices as follows:
D1 =
(b+ t− p1 + p2)(1− α)
2t
, D2 =
(−b+ t− p1 + p2)(1− α)
2t
.
The profit functions of the platforms are⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
pi1 = rρ(D1 + αβ) + p1D1 =
(p1+rρ)(b+t−p1+p2)(1−α)
2t
+ αβrρ,
pi2 = rρ+ p2D2 =
p2(−b+t+p1−p2)(1−α)
2t
+ rρ.
From the first-order conditions for profit maximization, we have the equilib-
rium prices, demands, profits, consumer surplus, and social surplus as shown
in Table 1. The equilibrium in the other asymmetric case is similar.
In this chapter, we exclude cases in which all new customers choose the
same hardware device (“tipping”). This requires us to assume that the
premise of the following Lemma is true, that the hardware devices of the
two firms are inherently differentiated.
Lemma 2.1. If the hardware of the two firms is sufficiently differentiated
that t > (b+ rρ)/3, then there exists an equilibrium in which both platforms
have positive market shares for new customers.
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Proof. Tipping is the situation in which the market structure is asymmetric
and the incompatible platform captures all the new customers. Therefore, in
order to exclude tipping it must hold that the market share of the incompat-
ible platform is less than one:
1
2
+
b+ rρ
6t
< 1 ⇐⇒
b+ rρ
6t
<
1
2
⇐⇒ t >
b+ rρ
3
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Table 2.1: Equilibrium price, demands, profits, consumer surplus, and social surplus.
(IC, IC) (C, C) (IC, C)
p1 t− rρ t t−
2
3
rρ+ b
3
p2 t− rρ t t−
1
3
rρ− b
3
D1
1
2
(1− α) 1
2
(1− α)
(
1
2
+ b+rρ
6t
)
(1− α)
D2
1
2
(1− α) 1
2
(1− α)
(
1
2
− b+rρ
6t
)
(1− α)
pi1
t
2
(1− α) + αβrρ t
2
(1− α) + rρ (3t+b+rρ)
2
18t
(1− α) + αβrρ
pi2
t
2
(1− α) + α(1− β)rρ t
2
(1− α) + rρ (3t−b−rρ)
2
18t
(1− α) + rρ
CSN
(
v + b− 5
4
t+ rρ)(1− α)
(
v + 2b− 5
4
t
)
(1− α)
(
(b+rρ)2
36t
+ v + 3
2
b− 5
4
t+ 1
2
rρ
)
(1− α)
CSE α · b α · 2b α(1 + β) · b
SS
(
v − 1
4
t
)
(1− α) + b+ ρ
(
v − 1
4
t
)
(1− α) + 2(b+ ρ)
(
5(b+ρ)2
36t
+ v − 1
4
t
)
(1− α)
+(b+ ρ)
(
3
2
+ α
(
β − 1
2
))
19
2.4.4 Comparative statics
We next compare the equilibrium prices, demands, profit, consumer surplus,
and social surplus under the various market structures. First, we assert the
following proposition regarding prices and demands.
Proposition 2.1. When the benefit of content is large enough to satisfy the
condition b > 2rρ, then the equilibrium prices and demands are ordered as
follows:
p2(IC,C) = p1(C, IC) < pi(IC, IC) < pi(C,C) < p1(IC,C) = p2(C, IC),
D2(IC,C) = D1(C, IC) < Di(IC, IC) = Di(C,C) < D1(IC,C) = D2(C, IC).
Proof. These results can be easily shown from the results in Table 2.1.
This proposition shows the natural result that when consumers get much
benefit from content, the relative price and demand for a hardware de-
vice increases as it has more usable content compared to competing de-
vices: p1(C, IC) < p2(C, IC) and D1(C, IC) < D2(C, IC). It is also the case
that the prices tend to be higher when both devices are compatible with
the others’ content compared to the case in which both are incompatible:
pi(IC, IC) < pi(C,C). That is, compatibility softens price competition. A
similar result has been shown in the indirect network externalities literature
Schiff (2003); Doganoglu and Wright (2006); Miao (2010). And Matutes and
Regibeau (1988) and Economides (1989) showed that even in the absence
of network externalities, when firms sell compatible components, cutting the
hardware price will increase the demand for hybrid systems that use not only
the one firm’s component but also the rival firm’s component (i.e., rival’s
content). In this way, some benefit from increased demand accrues to the
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rival firm, which weakens the one firm’s incentive to cut its price. The logic
behind our result is subtly different and may be given as follows. Consider
the situation of incompatible platforms (IC, IC) and suppose that one plat-
form cuts its hardware price. Then the demand for its hardware increases,
which also increases the demand for its content. Because of the increase in
revenue from both sides of the two-sided market (the revenue from selling
its own hardware and the royalties from selling its content), a firm selling
incompatible hardware has a strong incentive to cut its price. However, when
the platforms are both compatible (C, C), and one of the firms cuts its hard-
ware price, then the demand for its hardware increases but, in our model, the
demand for its content does not increase. This is because of our assumption
that any consumer purchases all available content for his hardware device.
By this assumption, under compatible platforms, the total demand for either
firm’s content is constant and equal to 1. Thus, the firms have less incentive
to price their hardware aggressively under compatible platforms (C, C) than
they would do under incompatible platforms (IC, IC).
We find the same rank ordering for prices and demands under asymmetric
market structures. This allows us to derive the relations p1(C, IC)D1(C, IC) <
p1(IC, IC)D1(IC, IC) and p1(C,C)D1(C,C) < p1(IC,C)D1(IC,C). Thus we
obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 2.1. Consider a single-sided market in which platforms do not
charge royalties for content and earn revenue only by selling their hardware
devices to consumers. Then, incompatibility is the dominant strategy for both
platforms.
That is, if a platform cannot get profit from selling content in its market-
place, then the only effect of compatibility is to make the rival platform more
21
attractive to consumers. Thus in this single-sided market, it is the dominant
strategy equilibrium for both platforms to choose incompatible platforms.
However, by comparing the profits of platforms summarized in Table 2.1,
we have the following proposition.
Proposition 2.2. It follows that pii(IC, IC) < pii(C,C).
A similar result has been shown in Schiff (2003) and Doganoglu and
Wright (2006). From Corollary 2.1 and Proposition 2.2 we can find that the
equilibrium in the single-sided market, that is, (IC, IC), forms a prisoner’s
dilemma situation and leads to lower profits for both platforms.
Next, when we compare the equilibrium consumer surplus under the var-
ious market structures, we have the following result.
Proposition 2.3. It follows that
If b > 7rρ/5 and t > (b+ rρ)/3, then the consumer surplus is ordered as
(i) CSN(IC, IC) < CSN(IC,C) = CSN(C, IC) < CSN(C,C) for new cus-
tomers, and
(ii) CSE(IC, IC) < CSE(IC,C) = CSE(C, IC) < CSE(C,C) for existing
customers,
where CSN denotes consumer surplus for new customers, and CSE for ex-
isting customers.
Proof. See Appendix 1 for the proof.
While we find in Proposition 2.1 that compatibility leads to higher hard-
ware device prices compared to incompatibility, it also increases the variety
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of available content. Thus some consumers are better off with compatibility,
while other consumers are worse off. As Proposition 2.3 part (ii) shows, ex-
isting customers are always better off when compatibility prevails, because
they benefit from wider availability of content without paying higher hard-
ware prices. What about the new customers? Proposition 2.3 part (i) shows
that when the benefit of content is large enough, then compatible platforms
provide more benefit for new consumers than do incompatible platforms.
Finally, we will compare the social surplus among the different market
structures. We assert the following proposition.
Proposition 2.4. When the degree of differentiation is large enough to sat-
isfy the condition t > Max
(
5(b + ρ)/18, (b + rρ)/3
)
, then the equilibrium
social surplus are ordered as follows:
SS(IC, IC) < SS(IC,C) ≤ SS(C,C), SS(IC, IC) < SS(C, IC) ≤ SS(C,C).
Proof. See Appendix 2 for the proof.
From Propositions 2.3 and 2.4 we can find that the compatible platforms
outcome (C, C) is optimal in the light of not only consumer surplus but also
social surplus.
2.5 Subgame-perfect equilibrium
In the previous section, we examined the subgame equilibrium in stage two.
Here we use the results of the analyses to derive the subgame-perfect equi-
librium of the two-stage game using backward induction. To determine the
equilibrium, we first compare the equilibrium profits under the various mar-
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ket structures in stage two. Using the equilibrium profits shown in Table 2.1,
we have the following Lemma 2.2.
Lemma 2.2. It follows that
β > β1(α) ⇐⇒ pi1(IC, IC) > pi1(C, IC),
β > β2(α) ⇐⇒ pi2(IC,C) > pi2(IC, IC),
β > β3(α) ⇐⇒ pi1(IC,C) > pi1(C,C),
β > β4(α) ⇐⇒ pi2(C,C) > pi2(C, IC),
where
β1(α) =
6t(b+ rρ)− (b+ rρ)2
18trρ
−
6t(b− 2rρ)− (b+ rρ)2
18trρ · α
,
β2(α) = −
6t(b− 2rρ)− (b+ rρ)2
18trρ
+
6t(b− 2rρ)− (b+ rρ)2
18trρ · α
,
β3(α) =
6t(b+ rρ) + (b+ rρ)2
18trρ
−
6t(b− 2rρ) + (b+ rρ)2
18trρ · α
,
β4(α) = −
6t(b− 2rρ) + (b+ rρ)2
18trρ
+
6t(b− 2rρ) + (b+ rρ)2
18trρ · α
,
β1 + β2 = 1, and β3 + β4 = 1.
Platforms choose between compatibility and incompatibility in stage one
of the game. From Lemma 2.2, depending on parameter values, we can
identify four possible subgame-perfect equilibria as follows.
Lemma 2.3. It follows that
(i) (IC, IC) is an equilibrium when β1(α) ≤ β ≤ β2(α),
(ii) (IC, C) is an equilibrium when β2(α) ≤ β and β3(α) ≤ β,
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(iii) (C, IC) is an equilibrium when β ≤ β1(α) and β ≤ β4(α),
(iv) (C, C) is an equilibrium when β4(α) ≤ β ≤ β3(α).
These results can be immediately shown from Lemma 2.
In Lemma 2.2, we can see that the graph of βi (i = 1, 2, 3, 4) is dependent
on the sign of the second term in each equation, that is, the signs of 6t(b −
2rρ)+ (b+ rρ)2 and 6t(b− 2rρ)− (b+ rρ)2. Therefore, there are three cases;
(Case 1) 6t(b− 2rρ) + (b+ rρ)2 > 0 and 6t(b− 2rρ)− (b+ rρ)2 > 0
⇐⇒ b > 2rρ and t > Max
(
(b+rρ)2
6|b−2rρ|
, b+rρ
3
)
,
(Case 2) 6t(b− 2rρ) + (b+ rρ)2 > 0 and 6t(b− 2rρ)− (b+ rρ)2 < 0
⇐⇒ rρ < b < 5rρ and b+rρ
3
< t < (b+rρ)
2
6|b−2rρ|
,
(Case 3) 6t(b− 2rρ) + (b+ rρ)2 < 0 and 6t(b− 2rρ)− (b+ rρ)2 < 0
⇐⇒ b < 2rρ and t > Max
(
(b+rρ)2
6|b−2rρ|
, b+rρ
3
)
.
When we use Lemma 2.3 in each case, we can describe the partition
of the parameter space (α, β). The parameter space (α, β) is divided into
several regions which have different subgame perfect equilibria. The following
proposition gives the partition of the parameter space in Case 1.
Proposition 2.5. Consider Case 1, that is, both the benefit of content and
the degree of hardware differentiation are large enough to satisfy the condi-
tions b > 2rρ and t > Max
(
(b+ rρ)2/(6|b−2rρ|), (b+ rρ)/3
)
. Then depend-
ing on parameter values, the equilibrium market structure is either: (A) in-
compatible platforms; (B) compatible platforms; (C) incompatible-compatible
platforms; (D) compatible-incompatible platforms; or (E) multiple equilibria
(IC,C) and (C,IC). Figure 2.2 illustrates the possibilities in (α, β) space.
The result can be immediately shown from Lemma 2.3. Suppose that
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Figure 2.2: Equilibrium Market Structure of Case 1.
α is relatively small (as in the introductory stage of the product life cycle)
and there are many new customers who need to purchase hardware devices.
Then it is of great importance to platforms to sell hardware devices to new
customers and add them to their installed bases. In such a situation, com-
patibility is unprofitable because it increases the attractiveness of the rival’s
hardware device by providing wider availability of content. Therefore, the
unique equilibrium is one in which platforms are incompatible (IC, IC).
In contrast, consider the situation in which α is large (as in the mature
stage of the product life cycle) so that almost all customers are in the in-
stalled base of some platform. They already have hardware devices and only
want to purchase content. Then a platform obtains most of its profit by
selling content in its marketplace and obtaining royalties. In such a situa-
tion, compatibility is more profitable than incompatibility. Thus, the unique
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equilibrium is one in which platforms are compatible (C, C).
Suppose that α is at an intermediate level (i.e., in the growth stage of the
product life cycle). First, consider the situation in which there is a large dif-
ference between the market shares of two firms. Then for the small platform
(with a small installed customer base) the profitable choice is to make its
content compatible with the larger rival’s hardware device and garner royal-
ties from the sale of content to the installed base of the rival firm. However,
for the large platform (with a large installed customer base), the profitable
choice is to make its content incompatible with the hardware device of the
smaller rival, and maintain its share of the hardware market by preserving
the wider availability of content on its hardware devices, as shown in regions
C and D of figure 2.2.
Next, consider the situation in which there is little difference between
the market shares of the two firms. Then there are multiple equilibria as
shown in region E in Figure 2.2. The market has the property of a game of
“chicken”. That is, either firm will make more profit by making its content
incompatible with the rival’s hardware device, given that the rival does the
opposite.
Figure 2.2 illustrates the possibilities of equilibrium in (α, β) space for
given values of the other parameters b and t. Performing comparative statics
with respect to the parameters b and t gives the following two corollaries.
Corollary 2.2. As the parameter b becomes larger, every function βi shifts
to the right. Therefore, the larger benefit from content increases the region
A (equilibria with only incompatible platforms) and decreases the region B
(equilibria with only compatible platforms).
Proof. See Appendix 3 for the proof.
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The intuition for this result is the following. When the benefit of content
becomes large, new customers are likely to choose the hardware device which
has more usable content. Then choosing compatibility is not profitable for
any firm because it provides more usable content for the rival’s hardware
device.
Corollary 2.3. As the parameter t increases, the functions β1 and β3 get
closer and the functions β2 and β4 also get closer. Therefore, the larger
degree of hardware differentiation increases the region A (equilibria with only
incompatible platforms) and the region B (equilibria with only compatible
platforms).
Proof. See Appendix 4 for the proof.
The intuition behind the increase of region B is given as follows. The
larger is t, the smaller is the profit loss from hardware device derived from
the compatibility decision. So given the profit gain from larger demand of
content from the compatibility decision, it is more likely to use the strategy
of compatibility. Thus, the region B increases.
Next, we will consider Case 2. The following proposition gives the parti-
tion of the parameter space in Case 2.
Proposition 2.6. Consider Case 2, that is, both the benefit of content and
the degree of hardware differentiation are at an intermediate level that satis-
fies the conditions rρ < b < 5rρ and (b+ rρ)/3 < t < (b+ rρ)2/(6|b− 2rρ|).
Then, depending on parameter values, the equilibrium market structure is
either: (A) there are multiple equilibria (IC, C) and (C, IC); (B) compati-
ble platforms (C, C); (C) incompatible-compatible platforms (IC, C); or (D)
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compatible-incompatible platforms (C, IC). Figure 2.3 illustrates these possi-
bilities in (α, β) space.
Figure 2.3: Equilibrium Market Structure of Case 2.
They can be immediately shown from Lemma 2.3. The difference from
Proposition 2.5 is that (IC, IC) is not a possible equilibrium when the degree
of hardware differentiation is small. The intuition for this result is the follow-
ing. When the degree of hardware differentiation is relatively small, there is
keen competition in hardware pricing, which reduces the profit from selling
hardware. Then platforms are more likely to make their content compatible
with the rival’s hardware device to garner royalties by selling content to the
rival’s installed base. Hence, even in the introductory stage of the product
life cycle, incompatible platforms (IC, IC) is not an equilibrium market struc-
ture.
Finally, consider Case 3. The following proposition gives the partition of
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the parameter space in Case 3.
Proposition 2.7. Consider Case 3, that is, the benefit of content is small
enough to satisfy the condition b < 2rρ and the degree of hardware differ-
entiation is large enough to satisfy the condition t > Max
(
(b + rρ)2/(6|b −
2rρ|), (b+ rρ)/3
)
. Then the unique equilibrium market structure is one with
compatible platforms (C, C). Figure 2.4 illustrates the possibilities in (α, β)
space.
Figure 2.4: Equilibrium Market Structure of Case 3.
This can be immediately shown from Lemma 2.3. When the royalty from
selling a unit of content rρ is larger than one half of the marginal bene-
fit from content b, and the degree of hardware differentiation t is relatively
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large, making content compatible with the rival’s hardware device has little
adverse effect on the firm’s own sale of hardware devices. In such situation,
platforms are likely to make their content compatible with the rival’s hard-
ware device, and profit by garnering royalties from the sale of content to the
rival’s installed base. Thus the unique equilibrium is one with compatible
platforms (C, C).
2.6 Model extension
In this section, we relax our assumption that the content price ρ is exoge-
nously fixed to show the robustness of the main propositions obtained in
our basic model. We allow the determination of content price by content
providers.
We consider a three-stage game. That is, in stage one, the two platforms
independently and simultaneously choose between application compatibility
and incompatibility. In stage two, platforms independently and simultane-
ously set their hardware prices. Then the new consumers purchase hardware
device. In stage three, content providers independently and simultaneously
set their content prices. Then the customers purchase content. Following
Church and Gandal (2000), we suppose that the benefit consumers receive
from consuming N varieties of content is represented by w(N). We retain our
assumption that there are two kinds of content, N = 1, 2. Here we assume
that w(1) < w(2) and w(2) − w(1) < w(1). Solving the subgame in stage
three it can be easily seen that when a single content is available, content
price is set at ρ = w(1). When two content are available, content price is set
at ρ = w(2)− w(1).
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Using these results and solving the game backward, we have the equilib-
rium profits of platforms under the four different possible market structures
in stage two. Comparing those equilibrium profits, we can show that Lemma
2.2 in Section 2.5 is changed as follows.
Lemma 2.2a. It follows that
β > β1(α) ⇐⇒ pi1(IC, IC) > pi1(C, IC),
β > β2(α) ⇐⇒ pi2(IC,C) > pi2(IC, IC),
β > β3(α) ⇐⇒ pi1(IC,C) > pi1(C,C),
β > β4(α) ⇐⇒ pi2(C,C) > pi2(C, IC),
where
β1(α) =
6t{(1− r)W + r∆w}− {(1− r)W + r∆w}2
18tr∆w
−
6t{W − rw(2)}− {(1− r)W + r∆w}2
18tr∆w · α
,
β2(α) = −
6t{W − rw(2)}− {(1− r)W + r∆w}2
18tr∆w
+
6t{W − rw(2)}− {(1− r)W + r∆w}2
18tr∆w · α
,
β3(α) =
6t{(1− r)W + r∆w}+ {(1− r)W + r∆w}2
18tr∆w
−
6t{W − rw(2)}+ {(1− r)W + r∆w}2
18tr∆w · α
,
β4(α) = −
6t{W − rw(2)}+ {(1− r)W + r∆w}2
18tr∆w
+
6t{W − rw(2)}+ {(1− r)W + r∆w}2
18tr∆w · α
,
β1 + β2 = 1, β3 + β4 = 1, W ≡ 2w(1)− w(2), and ∆w ≡ w(2)− w(1).
Using these four functions, we can separate three cases similarly in Sec-
tion 2.5, and in each case we have the following propositions which give the
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partition of the parameter space.
Proposition 2.5a. Suppose that both the benefit of content and the degree
of hardware differentiation are large enough to satisfy the conditions 0 < r <
{2w(1)−w(2)}/w(2) and t > {(1− r)W + r∆w}2/6{W − rw(2)}. Then, de-
pending on parameter values, the equilibrium market structure is either: (A)
incompatible platforms; (B) compatible platforms; (C) incompatible-compatible
platforms; (D) compatible-incompatible platforms; or (E) multiple equilibria
(IC,C) and (C,IC). Figure 2.2 illustrates the possibilities in (α, β) space.
Proof. See Appendix 5 for the proof.
Proposition 2.6a. Suppose that both the benefit of content and the degree
of hardware differentiation are at an intermediate level that satisfies the con-
ditions,
(i) 0 < r < {2w(1) − w(2)}/w(2) and {(1 − r)W + r∆w}/6 < t < {(1 −
r)W + r∆w}2/6{W − rw(2)}, or
(ii) {2w(1)−w(2)}/w(2) < r < 2{2w(1)−w(2)}/{3w(1)−w(2)} and {(1−
r)W + r∆w}/6 < t < {(1− r)W + r∆w}2/6{rw(2)−W}.
Then, depending on parameter values, the equilibrium market structure is
either: (A) there are multiple equilibria (IC, C) and (C, IC); (B) compati-
ble platforms (C, C); (C) incompatible-compatible platforms (IC, C); or (D)
compatible-incompatible platforms (C, IC). Figure 2.3 illustrates these possi-
bilities in (α, β) space.
Proof. See Appendix 5 for the proof.
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Proposition 2.7a. Suppose that the benefit of content is small enough to
satisfy the condition {2w(1) − w(2)}/w(2) < r < 1 and the degree of hard-
ware differentiation is large enough to satisfy the conditions t > Max
(
{(1−
r)W + r∆w}2/6{rw(2)−W}, {(1− r)W + r∆w}/6
)
. Then the unique equi-
librium market structure is one with compatible platforms (C, C). Figure 2.4
illustrates the possibilities in (α, β) space.
Proof. See Appendix 5 for the proof.
By comparing Propositions 2.5 to 2.7 and Propositions 2.5a to 2.7a, we
see that even when content price is determined endogenously, the equilibrium
outcomes are qualitatively similar.
2.7 Discussion and conclusion
The purpose of this chapter was to understand how the product life cycle
affects the compatibility strategy of platforms in two-sided markets. To this
end, we proposed a duopoly model of platforms in which the market com-
prises two segments of consumers: the installed base of customers and the
new customers. We have developed a stylized model in which two competing
suppliers of platform hardware devices and content each chooses whether to
make its content compatible with the other’s hardware device. The sort of
platform business we have in mind is the market for electronic books. In
this market, Amazon has adopted the principle of “application compatibil-
ity”, meaning that e-books purchased in the Amazon store can be read not
only on the “Kindle” hardware devices that it sells but also on the electronic
readers sold by its rival Apple, the “iPad”, “iPod”, and “iPhone”. But Apple
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has chosen to make the electronic books that it sells incompatible with the
Amazon Kindle reader. That is, electronic books purchased at the Apple
iTunes store (so-called “iBooks”) can only be read on tablet-like devices also
supplied by Apple. They cannot be read on the Amazon Kindle. The main
question that our stylized model is intended to address is why these rivals
might have chosen opposite strategies with regard to compatibility with one
another’s hardware devices of the content each supplies.
This situation can be explained by using our results. Since the e-book
market is now in the growth stage of the product life cycle, α is at an inter-
mediate level. In addition, we suppose that the benefit of content (e-book) b
is relatively large. In this case, when there is a large difference between the
market shares of the two firms, asymmetric equilibria arise, corresponding
to regions C and D of Figure 2.2 and Figure 2.3, based on Proposition 2.5
and Proposition 2.6. In fact, Apple has a large installed base of iPad, iPod,
and iPhone users, and there is a great difference between the market shares
of hardware devices of the two firms, Apple and Amazon. For the small
platform (Amazon) the profitable choice is to make its content compatible
with the larger rival’s hardware device and gain royalties from expanding the
sale of content to the installed base of the rival firm. However, for the large
platform (Apple), the profitable choice is to make its content incompatible
with the hardware device of the smaller rival, and maintain its share of the
hardware market by preserving the wider availability of content on its hard-
ware devices. These roughly correspond to the relative positions of Amazon
and Apple in the market for electronic books and the hardware devices for
reading them.
In addition, we can show an example in which a switch of the compatibil-
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ity choice actually takes place over the product life cycle in the digital music
industry. Prior to 2007, online music stores such as Apple iTunes Store and
SONY mora have employed DRM (Digital Rights Management) which are
the technical systems and technologies to inhibit usage of music purchased
and downloaded. Thus, for example, consumers who want to listen to songs
downloaded from the iTunes Store had to have an iPod or other Apple device.
This structure of compatibility between Apple and SONY corresponded to
(IC, IC). However, on May 29, 2007 Apple released version 7.2 of its iTunes
software which allows users to purchase DRM-free music (called iTunes Plus
music) and play it on rivals’ hardware devices such as WALKMAN. Thus
the structure changed to (C, IC). Furthermore, on October 1, 2012 SONY
mora also began to allow users to purchase DRM-free music. As a result, the
structure of compatibility moved to (C, C).
In developing our model, we made a few simplifying assumptions. We as-
sumed that the royalty rate was predetermined and thus unaffected by firms’
compatibility choices. In particular, because the royalty rate is exogenous
in our model, the platforms cannot use it as a tool to compete for content
providers. This is a significant limitation of this chapter as an analysis of
two-sided markets. We also assumed that there was no possibility of one
platform fully capturing the market (tipping). A more complete analysis of
compatibility decisions which includes these issues remains for future work.
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2.8 Appendix
Appendix 1: Proof of Proposition 3
From the results in Table 2.1, we have
CSN(C,C)− CSN(IC,C)
=
(
v + 2b−
5
4
t
)
−
(
(b+ rρ)2
36t
+ v +
3
2
b−
5
4
t+
rρ
2
)
=
b
2
−
rρ
2
−
(b+ rρ)2
36t
=
18t(b− rρ)− (b+ rρ)2
36t
>
18 · b+rρ
3
· (b− rρ)− (b+ rρ)2
36t
=
1
36t
(b+ rρ)(5b− 7rρ) > 0
(
⇐⇒ b >
7
5
rρ
)
,
CSN(IC,C)− CSN(IC, IC)
=
(
(b+ rρ)2
36t
+ v +
3
2
b−
5
4
t+
rρ
2
)
−
(
v + b−
5
4
t+ rρ
)
=
b
2
−
rρ
2
+
(b+ rρ)2
36t
> 0 (⇐⇒ b > rρ)
Appendix 2: Proof of Proposition 4
From the results in Table 2.1, we have
SS(C,C)− SS(IC,C)
=
[(
v −
1
4
t
)
(1− α) + 2(b+ ρ)
]
−
[(
5(b+ ρ)2
36t
+ v −
1
4
t
)
(1− α) + (b+ ρ)
(
3
2
+ α
(
β −
1
2
))]
= −
5(b+ ρ)2
36t
(1− α) + (b+ ρ)
(
1
2
− α
(
β −
1
2
))
(This is decreasing function in β.)
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> −
5(b+ ρ)2
36t
(1− α) + (b+ ρ)
(
1
2
−
1
2
α
)
(for β < 1)
=
(
1
2
−
5(b+ ρ)
36t
)
(b+ ρ)(1− α) > 0
(
⇐⇒ t >
5
18
(b+ ρ)
)
SS(IC,C)− SS(IC, IC)
=
[(
5(b+ ρ)2
36t
+ v −
1
4
t
)
(1− α) + (b+ ρ)
(
3
2
+ α
(
β −
1
2
))]
−
[(
v −
1
4
t
)
(1− α) + b+ ρ
]
=
5(b+ ρ)2
36t
(1− α) + (b+ ρ)
(
1
2
+ α
(
β −
1
2
))
=
5(b+ ρ)2
36t
(1− α) + (b+ ρ)
(
1
2
(1− α) + αβ
)
> 0
Appendix 3: Proof of Corollary 2
Here we define α˜ and αˆ as
β1 = β2 ⇐⇒ α =
(b+ rρ)2 − 3t(2b− 4rρ)
(b+ rρ)2 − 3t(2b− rρ)
≡ α˜,
β3 = β4 ⇐⇒ α =
(b+ rρ)2 + 3t(2b− 4rρ)
(b+ rρ)2 + 3t(2b− rρ)
≡ αˆ.
The derivatives of α˜ and αˆ with respect to b are given by
∂α˜
∂b
=
18trρ(3t− b− rρ)
{b2 − 2b(3t− rρ) + rρ(3t+ rρ)}2
> 0 from Lemma 2.1, and
∂αˆ
∂b
=
18trρ(3t+ b+ rρ)
{b2 + 2b(3t+ rρ)− rρ(3t− rρ)}2
> 0.
Appendix 4: Proof of Corollary 3
The derivatives of α˜ and αˆ with respect to t are:
∂α˜
∂t
=
9rρ(b+ rρ)2
{(b+ rρ)2 − 3t(2b− rρ)}2
> 0, and
∂αˆ
∂t
= −
9rρ(b+ rρ)2
{(b+ rρ)2 + 3t(2b− rρ)}2
< 0.
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Appendix 5: Proof of Lemma 2.2a and Propositions 2.5a, 2.6a, and
2.7a.
In Section 2.6, we relaxed our assumption and allowed the determination of
content price by content providers. Then we showed the robustness of the
main propositions obtained our basic model. In this section 1 of Appendix,
at first we will show the equilibrium prices, demands, and profits under four
possible market structures given the compatibility decisions in stage one.
Second, we will provide the proofs of Lemma 2.2a, Propositions 2.5a, 2.6a,
and 2.7a given in Section 2.6.
Appendix 5.1 Equilibrium and comparative statics.
In this section of Appendix, we will derive the equilibrium prices, de-
mands, and profits under four possible market structures given the
compatibility decisions in stage one.
5.1.1 Incompatible platforms: (IC, IC)
In this case, a single content is only available for each hardware device.
The utility function of a new customer who is located at x can be
written as⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
u1 = w(1) + v − ρ1 − p1 − tx = v − p1 − tx
u2 = w(1) + v − ρ2 − p2 − t(1− x) = v − p2 − t(1− x).
Let xˆ be the location of a new customer who is indifferent between the
two hardware devices, and thus it equals the proportion of consumers
who buy hardware 1:
u1 = u2 ⇒ xˆ =
t− p1 + p2
2t
.
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Platform 1 maximizes its profit
pi1 = (p1 + rw(1)) ·
t− p1 + p2
2t
· (1− α) + αβrw(1)
with respect to its hardware price p1. Taking the first-order condition
and solving for price, we have the reaction function of platform 1 as
follows.
∂pi1
∂p1
= 0⇒ p1 =
t− rw(1) + p2
2
.
Similarly, we have the reaction function of platform 2 as follows.
p2 =
t− rw(1) + p1
2
.
Solving two reaction functions for hardware prices, we have the equi-
librium prices as follows:⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
p1 = t− rw(1)
p2 = t− rw(1).
We can derive the equilibrium profits of platforms as follows:⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
pi1 =
t
2
(1− α) + αβrw(1)
pi2 =
t
2
(1− α) + α(1− β)rw(1).
5.1.2 Compatible platforms: (C, C)
In this case, all content is usable on either hardware device. The utility
function of a new customer who is located at x can be written as⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
u1 = w(2) + v − ρ1 − ρ2 − p1 − tx = 2w(1)− w(2) + v − p1 − tx
u2 = w(2) + v − ρ1 − ρ2 − p2 − t(1− x) = 2w(1)− w(2) + v − p2 − t(1− x).
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Let xˆ be the location of a new customer who is indifferent between the
two hardware devices, and thus it equals the proportion of consumers
who buy hardware 1:
u1 = u2 ⇒ xˆ =
t− p1 + p2
2t
.
Platform 1 maximizes its profit
pi1 = p1 ·
t− p1 + p2
2t
· (1− α) + r{w(2)− w(1)}
with respect to its hardware price p1. Taking the first-order condition
and solving for price, we have the reaction function of platform 1 as
follows.
∂pi1
∂p1
= 0⇒ p1 =
t+ p2
2
.
Similarly, we have the reaction function of platform 2 as follows.
p2 =
t+ p1
2
.
Solving two reaction functions for hardware prices, we have the equi-
librium prices as follows: ⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
p1 = t
p2 = t.
We can derive the equilibrium profits of platforms as follows:⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
pi1 =
t
2
(1− α) + r{w(2)− w(1)} = t
2
(1− α) + r∆w
pi2 =
t
2
(1− α) + r{w(2)− w(1)} = t
2
(1− α) + r∆w.
where, ∆w ≡ w(2)− w(1).
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5.1.3 Incompatible-compatible platforms: (IC, C)
When platform 1 chooses incompatibility and platform 2 chooses com-
patibility, all content is usable with hardware device 1, but only content
supplied by firm 2 is usable with hardware device 2. In this case, the
utility functions of new customers are⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
u1 = w(2) + v − ρ1 − ρ2 − p1 − tx = 2w(1)− w(2) + v − p1 − tx
u2 = w(1) + v − ρ2 − p2 − t(1− x) = v − p2 − t(1− x).
Let xˆ be the location of a new customer who is indifferent between the
two hardware devices, and thus it equals the proportion of consumers
who buy hardware 1:
u1 = u2 ⇒ xˆ =
2w(1)− w(2) + t− p1 + p2
2t
=
W + t− p1 + p2
2t
.
where, W ≡ 2w(1)− w(2).
Platform 1 maximizes its profit
pi1 = (p1 + r∆w) ·
W + t− p1 + p2
2t
· (1− α) + αβr∆w
with respect to its hardware price p1. Taking the first-order condition
and solving for price, we have the reaction function of platform 1 as
follows.
∂pi1
∂p1
= 0⇒ p1 =
W − r∆w + t+ p2
2
.
Platform 2 maximizes its profit
pi2 = p2 ·
−W + t+ p1 − p2
2t
· (1− α)
+rw(1)
(
−W + t+ p1 − p2
2t
(1− α) + α(1− β)
)
42
+r∆w
(
W + t− p1 + p2
2t
(1− α) + αβ
)
with respect to its hardware price p2. Taking the first-order condition
and solving for price, we have the reaction function of platform 2 as
follows.
∂pi2
∂p2
= 0⇒ p2 =
t− (1 + r)W + p1
2
.
Solving two reaction functions for hardware prices, we have the equi-
librium prices as follows:⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
p1 = t+
W
3
−
rw(2)
3
p2 = t−
W
3
−
r{3w(1)−2w(2)}
3
.
We can derive the equilibrium profits of platforms as follows:⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
pi1 =
{3t+(1−r)W+r∆w}2
18t
+ αβr∆w
pi2 =
9t2+{(1−r)W+r∆w}2
18t
+ αrw(1)rw(2)−W (1−α−αr+3αβr)
3
.
5.1.3 Incompatible-compatible platforms: (IC, C)
Similarly, when platform 1 chooses compatibility and platform 2 chooses
incompatibility, we have the hardware prices and profits of platform as
follows. ⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
p1 = t−
W
3
−
r{3w(1)−2w(2)}
3
p2 = t+
W
3
−
rw(2)
3
.
We can derive the equilibrium profits of platforms as follows:⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
pi1 =
9t2+{(1−r)W+r∆w}2
18t
+ αrw(1)rw(2)−W (1−α−αr+3α(1−β)r)
3
pi2 =
{3t+(1−r)W+r∆w}2
18t
+ α(1− β)r∆w.
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Appendix 5.2 Subgame-perfect equilibrium.
Using the equilibrium profits shown in Appendix 5.1, we have Lemma
2.2a in Section 2.6. The proof is given as follows.
Proof of Lemma 2.2a First we compare the equilibrium profits under (IC,
IC) and (C, IC).
pi1(IC, IC)− pi1(C, IC)
=
[
t
2
(1− α) + αβrw(1)
]
−
[
9t2 + {(1− r)W + r∆w}2
18t
+
αrw(1)rw(2)−W (1− α− αr + 3α(1− β)r)
3
]
≥ 0
⇐⇒ β ≥
6t{(1− 2r)W + rw(1)}− {(1− r)W + r∆w}2
18tr∆w
−
6t{W − rw(2)}− {(1− r)W + r∆w}2
18tr∆w · α
≡ β1(α)
Second, we compare the equilibrium profits under (IC, IC) and (IC,
C).
pi2(IC, IC)− pi2(IC,C)
=
[
t
2
(1− α) + α(1− β)rw(1)
]
−
[
9t2 + {(1− r)W + r∆w}2
18t
+
αrw(1)rw(2)−W (1− α− αr + 3αβr)
3
]
≥ 0
⇐⇒ β ≤
6t{2rw(1)− (1 + r)W}+ {(1− r)W + r∆w}2
18tr∆w
+
6t{W − rw(2)}− {(1− r)W + r∆w}2
18tr∆w · α
≡ β2(α)
Third, we compare the equilibrium profits under (IC, C) and (C, C).
pi1(IC,C)− pi1(C,C)
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=[
9t2 + {(1− r)W + r∆w}2
18t
+
αrw(1)rw(2)−W (1− α− αr + 3α(1− β)r)
3
]
−
[
t
2
(1− α) + r∆w
]
≥ 0
⇐⇒ β ≥
6t{(1− r)W + r∆w}+ {(1− r)W + r∆w}2
18tr∆w
−
6t{W − rw(2)}+ {(1− r)W + r∆w}2
18tr∆w · α
≡ β3(α)
Finally, we compare the equilibrium profits under (C, IC) and (C, C).
pi2(C, IC)− pi2(C,C)
=
[
{3t+ (1− r)W + r∆w}2
18t
+ α(1− β)r∆w
]
−
[
t
2
(1− α) + r∆w
]
≥ 0
⇐⇒ β ≤ −
6t{W − rw(2)}+ {(1− r)W + r∆w}2
18tr∆w
+
6t{W − rw(2)}+ {(1− r)W + r∆w}2
18tr∆w · α
≡ β4(α)
Thus, Lemma 2.2a holds.
In Lemma 2.2a, we can see that the graph of βi (i = 1, 2, 3, 4) is depen-
dent on the sign of the second term in each equation, that is, the signs
of 6t{W − rw(2)}− {(1− r)W + r∆w}2 and 6t{W − rw(2)} + {(1−
r)W + r∆w}2. Therefore, there are three cases.
Case 1: 6t{W−rw(2)}−{(1−r)W+r∆w}2 > 0 and 6t{W−rw(2)}+
{(1− r)W + r∆w}2 > 0.
Case 2: 6t{W−rw(2)}−{(1−r)W+r∆w}2 < 0 and 6t{W−rw(2)}+
{(1− r)W + r∆w}2 > 0.
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Case 3: 6t{W−rw(2)}−{(1−r)W+r∆w}2 < 0 and 6t{W−rw(2)}+
{(1− r)W + r∆w}2 < 0.
Propositions 2.5a, 2.6a, and 2.7a are derived from Cases 1, 2, and 3
respectively.
Proof of Proposition 2.5a We consider Case 1 in which
6t{W − rw(2)}− {(1− r)W + r∆w}2 > 0
and 6t{W − rw(2)}+ {(1− r)W + r∆w}2 > 0
⇐⇒ −6t{W − rw(2)} < {(1− r)W + r∆w}2 < 6t{W − rw(2)}
Then, it must hold that
W − rw(2) > 0 ⇐⇒ r <
2w(1)− w(2)
w(2)
< 1.
In addition, it is necessary to hold that
t >
{(1− r)W + r∆w}2
6{W − rw(2)}
If these two conditions are satisfied, tipping is excluded. Thus, Case 1
is characterized as the following conditions:
Case 1: 0 < r < 2w(1)−w(2)
w(2)
and t > {(1−r)W+r∆w}
2
6{W−rw(2)}
.
Thus, we have Proposition 2.5a.
Proof of Proposition 2.6a We consider Case 2 in which
6t{W − rw(2)}− {(1− r)W + r∆w}2 < 0
and 6t{W − rw(2)}+ {(1− r)W + r∆w}2 > 0
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(i) Suppose that W − rw(2) > 0 ⇐⇒ r < W
w(2)
.
Then it is obvious that 6t{W − rw(2)} + {(1− r)W + r∆w}2 > 0. It
is easy to see that
6t{W − rw(2)}− {(1− r)W + r∆w}2 < 0
⇐⇒ t <
{(1− r)W + r∆w}2
6{W − rw(2)}
.
When we add the condition to exclude tipping solution, Case 2 is char-
acterized as the following conditions:
0 < r <
2w(1)− w(2)
w(2)
and
(1− r)W + r∆w
6
< t <
{(1− r)W + r∆w}2
6{W − rw(2)}
.
(ii) Suppose that W−rw(2) < 0 ⇐⇒ W
w(2)
< r < 1. Then it is obvious
that 6t{W − rw(2)}− {(1− r)W + r∆w}2 < 0. We can see that
6t{W − rw(2)}+ {(1− r)W + r∆w}2 > 0
⇐⇒ t <
{(1− r)W + r∆w}2
6{rw(2)−W}
.
When we add the condition to exclude tipping solution, Case 2 is char-
acterized as the following conditions:
2w(1)− w(2)
w(2)
< r < 1 and
(1− r)W + r∆w
6
< t <
{(1− r)W + r∆w}2
6{rw(2)−W}
.
However, in order to satisfy the second conditions it must hold that
{(1− r)W + r∆w}2
6{rw(2)−W}
−
(1− r)W + r∆w
6
> 0 ⇐⇒ r <
2W
3w(1)− 2w(2)
.
Hence, we rearrange the conditions for Case 2 as follows:
2w(1)− w(2)
w(2)
< r <
2W
3w(1)− 2w(2)
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and
(1− r)W + r∆w
6
< t <
{(1− r)W + r∆w}2
6{rw(2)−W}
.
From the conditions (i) and (ii), Case 2 is characterized the following
conditions:
Case 2:
(
2w(1)−w(2)
w(2)
< r < 1 and (1−r)W+r∆w
6
< t < {(1−r)W+r∆w}
2
6{rw(2)−W}
)
or(
2w(1)−w(2)
w(2)
< r < 2W
3w(1)−2w(2)
and (1−r)W+r∆w
6
< t < {(1−r)W+r∆w}
2
6{rw(2)−W}
)
Thus, we have Proposition 2.6a.
Proof of Proposition 2.7a We consider Case 3 in which
6t{W − rw(2)}− {(1− r)W + r∆w}2 < 0
and 6t{W − rw(2)}+ {(1− r)W + r∆w}2 < 0
These conditions are rearranged as
6t{W − rw(2)} < {(1− r)W + r∆w}2 < −6t{W − rw(2)}
⇐⇒ r >
2w(1)− w(2)
w(2)
and t >
{(1− r)W + r∆w}2
6{rw(2)−W}
When we add the condition to exclude tipping solution, Case 3 is char-
acterized the following conditions:
Case 3: r > 2w(1)−w(2)
w(2)
and t > max
{
{(1−r)W+r∆w}2
6{rw(2)−W}
, (1−r)W+r∆w
6
}
Thus, we have Proposition 2.7a.
48
Chapter 3
Welfare Effects of Process
Innovation in Two-Sided
Markets: The Role of
Compatibility Decisions
3.1 Introduction
We extend the modeling of R&D investment competition into two-sided mar-
kets. There are many two-sided markets characterized by hardware-software
systems. Examples include video games and video game consoles, digital
music and playback devices, and e-books and digital readers. In these two-
sided markets, platforms have two sources of revenues: the revenue from
selling their hardware to consumers, and the royalties from selling software
(content) at their marketplaces. Depending on the situation, platforms must
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make strategic choices as to which revenue source to more fully cultivate.
As a matter of fact, compatibility decisions as to whether to make one’s
software compatible with the other’s device are very important for platforms.
Compatibility (application compatibility) here means that a platform enables
users of others’ hardware devices to use content (application software) that it
supplies in its marketplace. That is, adopting compatibility means opening
up its marketplace for users of other hardware devices. When making its
software compatible with the rival’s hardware device, on the one hand the
platform can support a wider demand for the software the platform is selling,
but at the same time it is unprofitable because it increases the attractiveness
of the rival’s hardware device by wider availability of software. For instance,
in the market for e-books, Amazon has adopted the principle of compatibility
and made it possible for users of its rival’s iPad to purchase e-books from the
Amazon Kindle Store. In contrast, Apple has chosen incompatibility and the
users of Amazon Kindle cannot purchase e-books at the Apple iTunes Store.
Compatibility decisions such as this may depend on whether the platform
is more focused on hardware sales or on royalties from the sale of software
(content).
Moreover, the compatibility strategy affects the incentive for hardware in-
vestment by rival platforms. That is, when one platform selects compatibility
with others’ content, the rival platform has superior availability of content
on its own hardware device. This in turn increases the demand for hardware
from rival platforms, and so one may expect that rival platforms will have
higher incentives to invest. The aim of this chapter is to provide a frame-
work that accounts for R&D investment competition in two-sided markets
that incorporates compatibility decisions by the competing platforms.
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We present a model in which there are two platforms, and each platform
provides a differentiated hardware device and operates its marketplace which
distributes content for its own hardware device. Consumers buy one unit of
hardware and, at most, one unit of each content. Platforms earn revenues
from the price they charge for hardware, and from the royalties from content
that buyers consume with the hardware. We assume that the royalty rate
and the content prices are exogenous. We use a Hotelling model of product
differentiation to analyze the consumers’ choice of platform. We consider a
three-stage game. In stage one, each platform chooses between compatibility
and incompatibility. In stage two, each platform makes investment in reduc-
ing hardware costs. Finally in stage three, each platform sets the price of its
hardware device.
In this setting, we argue that process innovation (increased efficiency of
cost-reducing investment) of the hardware device can reduce the social sur-
plus. Suppose that the efficiency of investment remains at a lower level, and
the hardware devices are not much differentiated. Then we can show that
the equilibrium is asymmetric: one platform selects incompatibility (IC) with
the others content, while the other platform selects compatibility (C). The
intuition behind this result is the following. If the rival platform chooses
compatibility, the profitable choice is to make its content incompatible with
the rival’s hardware device and gain larger profits from hardware sales by
preserving the superior availability of content on its own hardware device.
Alternatively, if the rival platform chooses incompatibility, then incompati-
bility is unprofitable because there is stiff competition in hardware pricing
when the degree of hardware differentiation is small, which reduces the profit
from selling the hardware device. Then the profitable choice is to make its
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content compatible with the rival’s hardware device to get royalties by selling
content to the rival’s installed base. Hence, the asymmetric case of (IC, C)
or (C, IC) is the equilibrium.
In such a situation, we consider the effect of increased efficiency of in-
vestment. We first show that an equilibrium with tipping (corner solution)
can arise as one of the equilibria under such an asymmetric case. The rea-
son is that the platform that has chosen incompatibility, say platform 1, can
get more demand for its hardware as it has more usable content compared
to a competing platform, say platform 2. Then the marginal revenue from
investment is larger for platform 1. Hence it is more aggressive on cost-
reducing investment, which makes it possible to capture the entire market
for hardware devices when the efficiency of investment is increased to higher
levels.
In any one of the following three cases, platform 2 does not have an
incentive to deviate from compatibility to incompatibility. First, when the
royalties from selling content are large enough, platform 2 does not have
any incentive to deviate from maintaining compatibility, even if it lost the
market of hardware to the platform 1. Second, when the degree of hardware
differentiation is very small, or third, when the efficiency of investment is
extremely high, it is unprofitable for platform 2 to deviate from compatibility
to incompatibility. This is because in addition to the loss of royalties from
selling content it is difficult to gain profit from hardware sales due to the stiff
price competition through cost-reducing investments.
Alternatively, when the royalties from selling content are small, the degree
of hardware differentiation is large, and the efficiency of investment is high
enough to lead to an equilibrium with tipping but not extremely high, then
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there is an incentive for the platform 2 to deviate from compatibility to
incompatibility in order to defend the market for its hardware. Then the
case of incompatible platforms (IC, IC) can be an alternative equilibrium.
In sum, in the situation where the asymmetric case of (IC, C) is the unique
equilibrium, when there is increased efficiency of cost-reducing R&D invest-
ment (process innovation), the process innovation affects the compatibility
decision, and another type of (IC, IC) can arise in equilibrium. This yields a
socially detrimental result. The social surplus under (IC, IC) becomes lower
than that under (IC, C). Because the total demand for hardware is fixed in
our Hotelling model, social surplus depends on three things: (i) the extent
of available content, (ii) the effect of cost-reducing investment, and (iii) the
consumers’ trip costs (disutility). First of all, the situation of (IC, IC) is
not beneficial for consumers because the variety of available content is less
for each hardware device. In addition, it is already explained that the plat-
form 1 that has chosen incompatibility has more incentive for cost-reducing
investment under the situation of (IC, C) and sells its hardware to many
consumers, thus the total effect of investment is smaller under (IC, IC) than
under (IC, C). In the aspect of the consumers’ trip costs, it can be easily seen
that they are lower under the symmetric situation of (IC, IC) than those un-
der asymmetric case of (IC, C). However, when consumers’ trip cost is not
so high, it has not much effect. Then the first and second effects dominate,
and social surplus becomes lower under (IC, IC) than under (IC, C). The key
point of this chapter is that the process innovation in two-sided markets has
not only positive direct effects of reducing costs but also negative indirect ef-
fects through the change of market structure from (IC, C) to (IC, IC) by the
strategic compatibility decisions of competing platforms. Hence we cannot
53
simply infer that the increased efficiency of cost-reducing R&D investment
(process innovation) is socially beneficial in two-sided markets.
For comparison, there can be no such counterintuitive case in a one-
sided market, because then each platform has a single source of revenue
from hardware sales. When one platform chooses compatibility, it has only
a negative effect on its profit as the other platform becomes more attractive.
That is, incompatibility is the dominant strategy in a one-sided market.
Therefore, it can be said that the main result in this chapter critically depends
on the two-sidedness of the market.
3.2 Related literature
This chapter relates to two bodies of research. One is the research of strate-
gic R&D competition. There is much literature dealing with strategic R&D
competition in traditional market structures, and the socially undesirable
effects of cost-reducing R&D investment have been argued in the technology
licensing literature which shows that licensing may reduce welfare if it induces
competitors to exit the market (Kabiraj and Marjit, 1992; Lin, 1996), facili-
tates collusion (Fauli-Oller and Sandonis, 2002), changes R&D organization
(Mukherjee, 2005), or induces excessive entry (Mukherjee and Mukherjee,
2008) etc. Furthermore, Chang et al. (2013) considers a three-stage (R&D,
technology licensing, and output) oligopoly game in which only one of the
firms undertakes cost-reducing R&D and finds that the availability of licens-
ing leads to lower social surplus, if the “efficiency of R&D investment” is
high. There is some connection with this finding because it explores the
possibility of welfare-reducing innovation. However, the problem we address
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here is inherently different. We explore the welfare effect of innovation me-
diated by compatibility decisions in two-sided markets, while their model is
about the welfare effects of licensing innovation in traditional markets.
Focusing on the argument comparing the incentive for R&D investment
under different market structures in two-sided markets, there are two strands
in the recent literature. One is the literature about open-source and propri-
etary platforms. Casadesus-Masanell and Llanes (2013) is the seminal article
on the incentives to invest in platform quality in proprietary and open-source
two-sided markets. They study a two-sided monopoly platform and show con-
ditions under which an open source may lead to higher investment in platform
quality than a proprietary platform. Another strand is the literature on net-
work neutrality and investment incentives such as Musacchio et al. (2009),
Choi and Kim (2010), and Economides and Hermalin (2012), among others.
These papers discuss which regulatory regime (neutral or non-neutral) yields
stronger investment incentives in the network infrastructure. In their models
of two-sided markets, the market structure (an open-source or a proprietary
platform, and net-neutrality or non-neutrality) is assumed to be exogenously
given.
This chapter is also related to the literature on compatibility in two-
sided markets.1 The recent papers of Doganoglu and Wright (2006), Miao
(2009), Casadesus-Masanell and Ruiz-Aliseda (2008), Viecens (2011), and
Maruyama and Zennyo (2013), among others, addressed the issue of compat-
1Compatibility among complementary components of system goods has been largely
studied in the mix-and-match literature (Matutes and Regibeau, 1988, 1992; Economides,
1989; Economides and Salop, 1992). But, little has been reported on compatibility in
two-sided markets.
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ibility between platforms. Maruyama and Zennyo (2013) contributes to the
literature by highlighting the equilibrium structure of compatibility changes
over the product life cycle while the other papers focus on competition given
the compatibility decisions. Recently, Hermalin and Katz (2013) analyze
compatibility decisions endogenously by focusing on the effect of exclusive
arrangements between platforms and application providers. These papers,
however, do not treat the R&D investment by platforms.
The unique contribution of this chapter lies in examining the welfare
effects of process innovation in a model of two-sided markets which endo-
genizes the determination of compatibility structure among platforms. To
the best our knowledge, this is the first one which explores the possibil-
ity of welfare-reducing process innovation in two-sided markets mediated by
strategic compatibility decisions of platforms.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. The next section develops
our basic framework and sets out the model. Section 3.3 presents the sub-
game equilibrium. Section 3.4 presents some comparative static analyses.
Section 3.5 presents the sub-game perfect equilibrium. Section 3.6 concludes
this chapter.
3.3 Model
3.3.1 Platforms
We suppose that there are two platforms, i = 1, 2, each selling a differenti-
ated hardware device i at a price pi (i = 1, 2) and operating its marketplace
i that distributes content for its own hardware device. Both platforms ex-
ante incur the same marginal cost c per unit of hardware device, and each
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platform invests yi to reduce marginal costs to c − yi. We assume that the
cost of the investment is given by ky2i . The parameter k expresses the effi-
ciency of cost-reducing investment where a decrease in k signifies the process
innovation of R&D investment. There are two content providers, i = 1, 2,
and they exclusively supply the content i to marketplace i at its price ρi.
Each platform charges a content provider for a royalty rate r (0 ≤ r ≤ 1)
for each unit of content sold at its marketplace. The unit of content has
the same benefit for consumers, and we assume that the price of content is
same for all content, ρi = ρ (i = 1, 2). In this chapter, we treat the royalty
rate r and the content price ρ as exogenous parameters.2 Thus, the decisions
by content providers are not considered in this model. However, we note in
advance that the main result we obtain in this chapter is derived from the
nature of two-sided markets. Each platform chooses whether to make its
content compatible with the rival’s hardware device (in what follows we use
the term application compatibility). Application compatibility enables the
users of other hardware devices to use content (application software) that it
supplies in its marketplace, which will not only make the rival’s hardware
more attractive to consumers by wider availability of content, but also make
it possible to gain more royalty revenue from a wider demand for the content
the platform is selling. We denote by δi the following function.
δi =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
0 if platform i chooses incompatibility
1 if platform i chooses compatibility.
2There is a real-life example of a common fixed royalty rate r in the e-book industry
(see, for example, Jiang, 2012; Knowledge@Wharton, 2012). Similarly, about the fixed
content price, we can suggest that in the iTunes Store almost all music is sold for $1.29
per track.
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The profit function of platform i can be written as
Πi = (pi − c+ yi) ·Di + rρ ·Di + δirρ ·Dj − ky
2
i , (i = 1, 2, j ̸= i).
where Di denotes the demand for hardware device i.
3.3.2 Consumers
We use the Hotelling model of product differentiation to analyze the con-
sumers’ platform choices. Each consumer’s preferences for platforms are rep-
resented by his location x on a line. Ideal points of consumers are uniformly
distributed on the unit interval [0, 1]. The hardware device i is located at
i − 1. Each consumer incurs a constant proportional disutility t per unit
length. Denote by v the benefit from hardware device, without loss of gen-
erality, which is normalized to zero. We assume that all consumers have the
same utility B for any content, which satisfies the condition, B > ρ. There-
fore, each consumer buys any usable content due to variety-seeking behavior.
The utility function of a consumer who is located at x, and buys hardware
device i and available content is given by
ui = Ni(B − ρ)− pi − t|x− (i− 1)|, (i = 1, 2),
where Ni is the amount of available content for hardware device i (Ni = 1, 2).
We will use the notation, b = B − ρ.
In this chapter, we consider the cost-reducing investment that raises the
possibility of tipping (corner solution). In the case of sufficiently low value of
t, even without the cost-reducing investment, corner solutions are the only
equilibria under asymmetric cases. Therefore, in order to exclude such cases,
we make the following assumption (See Lemma 2.1):
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Assumption 3.1. The hardware of the two platforms is sufficiently differ-
entiated that t > b+rρ
3
.
3.3.3 Timing of the game
We consider the following non-cooperative three-stage game. In stage one,
each platform chooses between application compatibility (C) and incompat-
ibility (IC). In stage two, each platform decides the level of cost-reducing
investment, yi. In stage three, each platform sets the price of hardware de-
vice, pi.
3.4 Sub-game equilibrium
Given the compatibility decisions in stage one, there are four possible cases
as follows.
1. (IC, IC); both platforms choose incompatibility.
2. (C, C); both platforms choose compatibility.
3. (IC, C); platform 1 chooses incompatibility and platform 2 chooses
compatibility.
4. (C, IC); platform 1 chooses compatibility and platform 2 chooses in-
compatibility.
In this section, we will derive the equilibrium prices, level of investment,
demands, profits, consumer surplus, and social surplus under the various
cases.
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3.4.1 Incompatible platforms
In this case, only a single content is available for each hardware device. The
utility function of a customer who is located at x can be written as
ui = b− pi − t|x− xi|, (i = 1, 2).
Let xˆ be the location of a consumer who is indifferent between the two
hardware devices, and thus it equals the proportion of consumers who buy
hardware 1:
u1 = u2 ⇒ xˆ =
t− p1 + p2
2t
.
Hence, the demand for hardware device i is
Di =
t− pi + pj
2t
, (i = 1, 2, j ̸= i).
Platform i maximizes its profit
Πi = (pi − c+ yi) Di + rρ Di − ky
2
i
= (pi − c+ yi + rρ) ·
t− pi + pj
2t
− ky2i , (i = 1, 2, j ̸= i)
with respect to its hardware price pi. Taking the first-order conditions and
solving for prices, we have the prices as follows:
pi(y1, y2) = t+ c− rρ−
2yi + yj
3
, (i = 1, 2, j ̸= i).
where the second-order conditions are satisfied. Substituting these prices
into the profit function of each platform, we have
Πi =
(3t+ yi − yj)
2
18t
− ky2i , (i = 1, 2, j ̸= i).
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Platform i maximizes its profit with respect to its investment level yi in stage
two. Taking the first-order conditions and solving for investment level, we
have the equilibrium level of the cost-reducing investment as follows:
yi(IC, IC) =
1
6k
.
We assume that the second-order condition is satisfied: 18kt− 1 > 0. Using
this equilibrium value, we can derive the equilibrium hardware price, demand,
and profit of platform as follows:
pi(IC, IC) = t+ c− rρ−
1
6k
,
Di(IC, IC) =
1
2
,
Πi(IC, IC) =
t
2
−
1
36k
, (i = 1, 2).
The profit of content provider is given by
pii(IC, IC) = (1− r)ρ ·
(
Di(IC, IC) + δiDj(IC, IC)
)
=
(1− r)ρ
2
, (i = 1, 2).
Consumer surplus and social surplus are given by
CS(IC, IC) =
∫ D1(IC,IC)
0
u1(x) dx+
∫ 1
D1(IC,IC)
u2(x) dx
=
1
6k
+ b−
5
4
t− c+ rρ,
SS(IC, IC) = CS(IC, IC) +
∑
i
Πi(IC, IC) +
∑
i
pii(IC, IC)
=
1
9k
+ b−
t
4
− c+ ρ.
These equilibrium values are summarized in Table 3.1, which appears in the
last of this chapter.
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3.4.2 Compatible platforms
When both platforms choose compatibility, all content is usable on either
hardware device. In this case, the utility function of a customer is
ui = 2b− pi − t|x− xi|, (i = 1, 2).
Let xˆ be the location of a customer who is indifferent between the two hard-
ware devices, and thus it equals the proportion of consumers who buy hard-
ware 1:
u1 = u2 ⇒ xˆ =
t− p1 + p2
2t
.
Hence, the demand for hardware device i is
Di =
t− pi + pj
2t
, (i = 1, 2, j ̸= i).
Platform i maximizes its profit
Πi = (pi − c+ yi) Di + rρ− ky
2
i
= (pi − c+ yi) ·
t− pi + pj
2t
+ rρ− ky2i ,
with respect to its hardware price pi. Solving the game with backward in-
duction, we can derive the equilibrium investment levels, prices, demands,
profits of platform and content provider, consumer surplus, and social sur-
plus, as in Table 3.1. Here, we assume that the second-order condition is
satisfied: 18kt− 1 > 0.
3.4.3 Incompatible-compatible platforms without tip-
ping
When platform 1 chooses incompatibility and platform 2 chooses compati-
bility, the consumers who have hardware device 1 can use all content, but
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the consumers who have hardware device 2 can use only content supplied by
platform 2. In this case, we must consider the possibility of tipping (corner
solution), where platform 1 that has the advantage of content variety mo-
nopolizes the hardware market. In this section, we consider the parameter
space in which interior solutions are the equilibrium, and the case of corner
solutions is analyzed in the next section. In the case of interior solutions, the
utility functions of consumers are⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
u1 = 2b− p1 − tx
u2 = b− p2 − t(1− x).
From these we can derive the demands for hardware devices as follows:
D1 =
b+ t− p1 + p2
2t
, D2 =
−b+ t+ p1 − p2
2t
.
The profit functions of the platforms are
Π1 = (p1 − c+ y1)D1 + rρD1 − ky
2
1
= (p1 − c+ y1 + rρ) ·
b+ t− p1 + p2
2t
− ky2i ,
Π2 = (p2 − c+ y2)D2 + rρ− ky
2
2
= (p2 − c+ y2) ·
−b+ t+ p1 − p2
2t
+ rρ− ky2i .
Solving the game with backward induction, we can derive the equilibrium
investment levels, prices, demands, profits of platform and content provider,
consumer surplus, and social surplus as shown in Table 3.1. We assume that
the second-order condition is satisfied: 18kt− 1 > 0.
Here we can get the following lemma for the existence of interior solution.
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Lemma 3.1. If the efficiency of investment is low enough to satisfy the
condition k > 1/(3(3t−b−rρ)) ≡ kˆ and the degree of hardware differentiation
is large enough to satisfy the condition t > (b+rρ)/3, then there exist interior
solutions under the asymmetric cases.
3.4.4 Incompatible-compatible platforms with tipping
In the previous section, we considered the case in which there exist interior
solutions under asymmetric case. Here we focus on the case of tipping (corner
solutions). The demand function of hardware device i can be written as
D1 =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1 if p1 ≤ b− t+ p2
b+t−p1+p2
2t
if b− t+ p2 ≤ p1 ≤ b+ t+ p2
0 if b+ t+ p2 ≤ p1,
D2 =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1 if p2 ≤ −b− t+ p1
−b+t+p1−p2
2t
if − b− t+ p1 ≤ p2 ≤ −b+ t+ p1
0 if − b+ t+ p1 ≤ p2.
The profit functions of platforms can be written as
Π1 =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
(p1 − c+ y1 + rρ) · 1− ky
2
1 if p1 ≤ b− t+ p2
(p1 − c+ y1 + rρ) ·
b+t−p1+p2
2t
− ky21 if b− t+ p2 ≤ p1 ≤ b+ t+ p2
−ky21 if b+ t+ p2 ≤ p1,
Π2 =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
(p2 − c+ y2) · 1 + rρ− ky
2
2 if p2 ≤ −b− t+ p1
(p2 − c+ y2) ·
−b+t+p1−p2
2t
+ rρ− ky22 if − b− t+ p1 ≤ p2 ≤ −b+ t+ p1
+rρ− ky22 if − b+ t+ p1 ≤ p2.
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From these profit functions, we can derive the following corner solutions.
Lemma 3.2. If the efficiency of investment and the degree of hardware dif-
ferentiation are large enough to satisfy the conditions 1/(8t) < k < 1/(2(3t−
b−rρ)) ≡ k and t > (b+rρ)/3, then there exist the following corner solutions
under asymmetric case.
y1(IC,C)
T =
1
2k
, y2(IC,C)
T = 0,
p1(IC,C)
T = c+ b− t , p2(IC,C)
T = c,
where suffix T denotes the case of tipping.
3.5 Comparative statics
We compare the equilibrium level of investment, prices, demands, profits,
consumer surplus, and social surplus under four market structures.
3.5.1 Non-tipping case
We compare the equilibrium values in the parameter space where there exist
the interior solutions under the asymmetric market structure. That is, we
perform comparative statics in the parameter space derived in Lemma 3.1,
k > kˆ and t > (b+rρ)/3. First, we assert the following proposition regarding
the investment levels.
Proposition 3.1. If the efficiency of investment is low enough to satisfy the
condition k > kˆ and the degree of hardware differentiation is large enough to
satisfy the condition t > (b + rρ)/3, then the equilibrium investment levels
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are ordered as follows:
y1(C, IC)
NT = y2(IC,C)
NT < yi(IC, IC) = yi(C,C) < y1(IC,C)
NT = y2(C, IC)
NT
where suffix NT denotes the case of non-tipping.
It is easy to see that both platforms choose the same investment level
under symmetric market structures. This result depends on the nature of
the Hotelling model. Under an asymmetric market structure, the platform
having the advantage of software variety has more incentive to invest since its
demand function shifts upward by more available content and the marginal
revenue of investment is increased. We assume that the marginal cost is large
enough to satisfy the condition c > max yi.
3
Next, we have the following proposition by comparing the prices of hard-
ware device summarized in Table 3.1.
Proposition 3.2. If the efficiency of investment is low enough to satisfy
the condition k > kˆ and the degree of hardware differentiation and the benefit
from a unit of content are large enough to satisfy the conditions t > (b+rρ)/3
and b > 3rρ, then the equilibrium prices are ordered as follows:
p1(C, IC)
NT = p2(IC,C)
NT < pi(IC, IC) < pi(C,C) < p1(IC,C)
NT = p2(C, IC)
NT.
The order of the equilibrium prices is similar to that of the equilibrium
investment levels. The only different thing is that the equilibrium price
under compatible platforms (C, C) is higher than that under incompatible
platforms (IC, IC). The logic of this result can be explained by the intuition
of Proposition 1 in Maruyama and Zennyo (2013).
3Using the following results, it is assumed to satisfy the condition c > 1/(2k).
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Next, when we compare the equilibrium consumer surplus under the var-
ious market structures, we have the following result.
Proposition 3.3. If the efficiency of investment is low enough to satisfy
the condition k > kˆ and the degree of hardware differentiation and the benefit
from a unit of content are large enough to satisfy the conditions t > (b+rρ)/3
and b > 3rρ, then the equilibrium consumer surpluses are ordered as follows:
CS(IC, IC) < CS(IC,C)NT = CS(C, IC)NT < CS(C,C).
Proposition 3.3 shows that as more platforms choose application compat-
ibility, the higher is consumer surplus. The reason is that when application
compatibility prevails, consumers can access more content.
Finally, we will compare the social surplus among the different market
structures. We assert the following proposition.
Proposition 3.4. If the efficiency of investment is low enough to satisfy
the condition k > kˆ and the degree of hardware differentiation and the benefit
from a unit of content are large enough to satisfy the conditions t > (b+rρ)/3
and b > 3rρ, then the equilibrium social surpluses are ordered as follows:
SS(IC, IC) < SS(IC,C)NT = SS(C, IC)NT.
In our Hotelling model, social surplus depends on three things: (i) the ex-
tent of available content, (ii) the effect of cost-reduction investment, and (iii)
the consumers’ trip costs (disutility). As for the first thing (i), the extent of
available content increases as the number of compatible platform increases.
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Thus, this beneficial effect on social surplus is the largest under compatible
platforms (C, C) and the lowest under incompatible platforms (IC, IC). As
for the second thing (ii), while the level of investment is the same for sym-
metric cases (IC, IC) and (C, C), it is beyond that level in the asymmetric
cases (IC, C) and (C, IC). The platform that has chosen incompatibility has
a greater incentive for aggressive investment, enough to offset the negative
investment by the compatible platform. Thus the total effect of investment is
larger under asymmetric cases than under symmetric cases. Finally, regard-
ing the third thing (iii), consumers’ trip costs are lower under the symmetric
situations (IC, IC) and (C, C) than those under asymmetric case (IC, C),
because the consumers’ trip cost is the lowest when the total demand for
hardware is evenly divided up between two platforms. Therefore, it is im-
mediately seen that SS(IC, IC) < SS(C,C). Furthermore, from Proposition
4 we find that SS(IC, IC) < SS(IC,C)NT = SS(C, IC)NT. However, the
comparison of social welfare between the asymmetric case and compatible
platforms (C, C) is ambiguous. While the case of compatible platforms (C,
C) is the best in terms of social welfare in the absence of R&D investment,
we can see that it does not hold when we consider the effect of cost-reducing
investment.
3.5.2 Tipping case
Next, we compare the equilibrium values in the parameter space in which
there exists tipping (corner solution) under asymmetric market structure,
(IC,C)T or (C, IC)T. That is, we perform comparative statics in the param-
eter space derived in Lemma 3.2, k < k and t > (b+ rρ)/3. First, we assert
the following proposition regarding the investment levels.
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Proposition 3.5. If the efficiency of investment and the degree of hardware
differentiation are large enough to satisfy the conditions 1/(8t) < k < k and
t > (b+ rρ)/3, then the equilibrium investment levels are ordered as follows:
y1(C, IC)
T = y2(IC,C)
T < yi(IC, IC) = yi(C,C) < y1(IC,C)
T = y2(C, IC)
T .
It is obvious from the results shown in Table 3.1. We can see that when
tipping occurs, the monopoly platform in the hardware market (say platform
1 in case of (IC, C)) makes the largest amount of investment and the dom-
inated platform (say platform 2 in such a case) makes the least investment
in any case.
Next, when we compare the equilibrium social surplus under the various
market structures, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 3.6. If the efficiency of investment is large enough to satisfy
the condition 1/(8t) < k < k and the degree of hardware differentiation is at
an intermediate level that satisfies the condition (b+ rρ)/3 < t < (b+ rρ)/2,
then the equilibrium social surpluses are ordered as follows:
SS(IC, IC) < SS(IC,C)T = SS(C, IC)T .
The social surplus under incompatible platforms (IC, IC) is smaller than
that under the asymmetric cases, (IC,C)T and (C, IC)T. This result is similar
to Proposition 3.4 in the case of non-tipping.
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3.6 Subgame-perfect equilibrium
In section 3.4, we examined the subgame equilibrium in stage two and stage
three. We use these results to solve the three-stage game with backward
induction. To determine the equilibrium, we compare the equilibrium profits
as shown in Table 3.1.
We analyze the best-response strategy for compatibility decisions in the
parameter space in which there exists an interior solution under the asym-
metric market structure. We have the following two lemmas.
Lemma 3.3. If the degree of hardware differentiation is at an intermediate
level that satisfies the condition (b + rρ)/3 < t < (b + rρ)/2 and the benefit
from a unit of content is small enough to satisfy the condition b < 5rρ, then
it holds that Π1(C, IC)
NT > Π1(IC, IC) for all k > kˆ.
The intuition for this result is the following. When the degree of hardware
differentiation is relatively small, due to the stiff competition in hardware
prices, the revenue for platforms from selling hardware devices is also small.
Therefore, even if compatibility is chosen, the reduction of the revenue from
hardware devices by choosing compatibility is small. In addition, since the
royalty revenue is relatively large in this case, it is beneficial for platforms
to choose compatibility and gain royalty revenue from consumers who have
the rival’s hardware device. In such a situation, compatibility is profitable,
given that the rival platform chooses incompatibility.
Lemma 3.4. When both the degree of hardware differentiation and the benefit
of content are large enough to satisfy the conditions t > b+rρ
3
and b > 2rρ,
then it holds that Π1(C,C) < Π1(IC,C)
NT for all k > kˆ.
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The intuition for this result is the following. Since the royalty revenue
is relative small in this case, it is beneficial for the platform to increase the
variety of available content by choosing incompatibility.
From Lemma 3.3 and Lemma 3.4, we can derive the following proposition.
Proposition 3.7. If both the degree of hardware differentiation and the
benefit of content are at the intermediate levels that satisfy the conditions
b+rρ
3
< t < b+rρ
2
and 2rρ < b < 5rρ, then for all k > kˆ, the equilibrium
market structures are the asymmetric ones without tipping, (IC,C)NT and
(C, IC)NT.
It is obvious from Lemma 3.3 and Lemma 3.4.
In Proposition 3.7, we suppose that t is small enough to satisfy the con-
dition t < (b+rρ)/2. When the degree of product differentiation is relatively
large, it is possible that symmetric cases (IC, IC) and (C, C) can be equilibria
as shown in Chapter 2. In this chapter, we focus on the parameter space in
which process innovation has a negative impact on social welfare through the
change of compatibility strategies from (IC, C) to (IC, IC). Therefore, this
chapter does not treat the parameter range in which symmetric compatibility
decisions can be equilibria even when the process innovation does not occur
(k is relatively large).
We can explain why the equilibrium is not symmetric under these con-
ditions even in the symmetric setting. Suppose that the rival chooses in-
compatibility and the degree of hardware differentiation is not very large.
Then, choosing incompatibility leads to a price competition in hardware de-
vices, which reduces the profit from selling hardware devices. Hence, when
the royalty from content is large, the platform has an incentive to choose
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compatibility and gain royalty revenue from consumers who have the rival’s
hardware device. On the other hand, if the rival chooses compatibility, then
by choosing incompatibility the platform gains the advantage of available
content and gets more profit from selling hardware devices. In sum, as long
as the efficiency of investment is relatively low, the equilibrium is asymmet-
ric, which is exactly the same as in the absence of R&D investment (See
Proposition 2.6).
Next, we analyze the best-response strategy about compatibility decisions
in the parameter space in which there exists tipping (corner solution) under
asymmetric market structure. We have the following two lemmas.
Lemma 3.5. If both the degree of hardware differentiation and the benefit of
content are large enough to satisfy the conditions t > (b+ rρ)/3 and b > rρ,
then it holds that Π1(IC,C)
T > Π1(C,C) for all 1/(8t) < k < k.
In the same logic of Lemma 3.4, choosing incompatibility is profitable for
the platform when the rival chooses compatibility. If the royalty revenue is
relatively small, then the platform has less incentive to choose compatibility
in the pursuit of royalty revenue.
Lemma 3.6. If the degree of hardware differentiation is large enough to
satisfy the condition t > (b+ rρ)/3, then the following inequality holds.⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
Π1(IC, IC) > Π1(C, IC)
T if t > 2rρ and k˜ < k < k,
Π1(IC, IC) < Π1(C, IC)
T if
(
t > 2rρ and 1/(8t) < k < min{k, k˜}
)
or
(
t < 2rρ and 1/(8t) < k < k
)
,
where k˜ ≡ 1/(18(t− 2rρ)).
72
Suppose that the parameter k is relatively large in the range of the pa-
rameter space that gives the possibility of tipping (corner solution) as equi-
librium under asymmetric market structures. In this situation, given that a
rival platform chooses incompatibility, choosing compatibility by a platform
makes the rival’s hardware device more attractive in the variety of content
and the market for hardware devices will be monopolized by the rival plat-
form. Then it is the best-response strategy for a platform to choose incom-
patibility when a rival platform chooses incompatibility. However, when the
parameter k is especially small and both platforms choose incompatibility,
they have excessive incentive for cost-reducing investment in hardware de-
vices. Then, through fierce investment competition neither platform gains
much revenue from selling hardware devices. Thus it is the best-response
strategy for a platform to choose compatibility and support a wider demand
for the content the platform is selling.
From Lemmas 3.5 and Lemma 3.6, we can derive the following proposi-
tion.
Proposition 3.8. If both the degree of hardware differentiation and the ben-
efit from content are large enough to satisfy the conditions t > (b+rρ)/3 and
b > rρ, then the equilibrium is given by⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
(IC, IC) if t > 2rρ and k˜ < k < k,
(IC,C)T or (C, IC)T if
(
t > 2rρ and 1/(8t) < k < min{k, k˜}
)
or
(
t < 2rρ and 1/(8t) < k < k
)
.
It is obvious form Lemma 3.5 and Lemma 3.6.
When the parameter t is relatively small (the degree of hardware differen-
tiation is not very large), by using a similar argument with Proposition 3.7,
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we can see that the equilibrium is asymmetric. However, if both k and t are
not so small, then each platform has an incentive to choose incompatibility
in stage one and prevent a rival platform from monopolizing the hardware
market.
From Propositions 3.7 and 3.8, the following Corollary 3.1 gives the par-
tition of parameter space when the royalty from a unit of content is relatively
large.
Corollary 3.1. Suppose that (b+ rρ)/3 < t < (b+ rρ)/2. When the royalty
revenue from a unit of content is large enough to satisfy the condition 2b/7 <
rρ < b/2, we can derive the partition of equilibrium in the parameter space
as shown in Figure 3.1. The equilibrium market structure is either: (A)
(IC,C)NT and (C, IC)NT; (B) (IC,C)NT, (C, IC)NT, (IC,C)T, and (C, IC)T;
or (C) (IC,C)T and (C, IC)T.
Figure 3.1: 2
7
b < rρ < b
2
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Suppose that the parameter t (the degree of hardware product differ-
entiation) is relatively small. In this situation, if a rival platform chooses
compatibility, then a platform has an incentive to choose incompatibility for
wider availability of content. If a rival chooses incompatibility, then a plat-
form has an incentive to choose compatibility since choosing incompatibility
leads to fierce investment competition. Then, each platform chooses the op-
posite strategy from the rival’s one relating to the compatibility decisions. In
addition, when the parameter k is relatively large (i.e., the efficiency of R&D
investment is relatively low), the equilibrium is the asymmetric one with
non-tipping, (IC,C)NT and (C, IC)NT. Here, under the asymmetric market
structure, the platform that chooses incompatibility has a relatively larger
demand for its hardware. Then, it has more incentive to invest in its hard-
ware device than does the rival platform.
As the parameter k decreases (i.e., the efficiency of R&D investment
increases), it makes easier for the platform that chooses incompatibility to
monopolize the hardware market. When the royalty revenue from a unit
of content is relatively large, the platform that chooses compatibility and
has no hardware demand can get the relatively large royalty revenue from
all consumers. Therefore, then the equilibrium is the asymmetric one with
tipping, (IC,C)T and (C, IC)T.
Corollary 3.1 also shows that, in the parameter range kˆ < k < k, there ex-
ist multiple equilibria, (IC,C)NT and (IC,C)T. In this range, the equilibrium
path depends on what belief each platform holds.4 If each platform believes
that the rival plays strategies (yi(IC,C)
NT, pi(IC,C)
NT) after platform 1
4We assume that two platforms have symmetric belief about rival’s strategies each
other.
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chooses incompatibility and platform 2 chooses compatibility in stage one,
then the equilibrium outcome becomes (IC,C)NT . Similarly, if each platform
believes that the rival plays strategies (yi(IC,C)
T , pi(IC,C)
T), then (IC,C)T
becomes an equilibrium.
Finally, when the royalty from a unit of content is relatively small, we can
derive the following corollary, which gives the partition of the equilibrium.
Corollary 3.2. Suppose that (b + rρ)/3 < t < (b + rρ)/2. When the roy-
alty revenue from a unit of content is small enough to satisfy the condition
b/5 < rρ < 2b/7, we can derive the partition of equilibrium in the parameter
space as shown in Figures 3.2 and 3.3. The equilibrium market structure is
either: (A) (IC,C)NT and (C, IC)NT; (B) (IC,C)NT, (C, IC)NT, (IC,C)T, and
(C, IC)T; (C) (IC,C)T and (C, IC)T; (D) (IC, IC); or (E) (IC,C)T, (C, IC)T,
and (IC, IC).
Figure 3.2: b
5
< rρ < 5
19
b Figure 3.3: 5
19
b < rρ < 2
7
b
When royalty revenue from a unit of content is smaller, the merit of
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choosing compatibility and supporting a wider demand for its content is not
so large. Hence, it is more likely to deviate from compatibility to incom-
patibility. In this situation, as shown in Figures 3.2 and 3.3, there exists a
parameter range (D and E) in which (IC, IC) is the equilibrium compatibility
decisions.
We can see that both (IC, IC) and (IC,C)NT become equilibrium out-
comes in some parameter spaces (e.g., the range (D) in Figure 3.2 and 3.3).
But this multiple equilibria does not indicate that platform 2 is indifferent be-
tween choosing incompatibility and compatibility in stage one. Suppose that
platform 1 only chooses incompatibility in stage one. When each platform
believes that the rival plays the strategies (yi(IC,C)
NT, pi(IC,C)
NT), then
the equilibrium outcome becomes (IC,C)NT. On the other hand, when each
platform believes that the rival plays the strategies (yi(IC,C)
T, pi(IC,C)
T),
platform 2 has an incentive to deviate from compatibility to incompatibil-
ity in stage one to avoid being dominated in the hardware device market.
Therefore, the equilibrium outcome becomes (IC, IC).
3.7 Discussion and conclusion
From Corollary 3.2 and Proposition 3.4, we can indicate the following para-
doxical result. The increased efficiency of cost-reducing investment (process
innovation) affects the compatibility decisions by platform. Hence, it leads
to the change of market structure, which has the negative impact on social
welfare.
In sum, the process innovation has a positive direct effect on social wel-
fare. But it may also lead to an equilibrium with inefficient market structure,
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(IC, IC) by affecting the compatibility decisions. Suppose that the efficiency
of investment is increased through process innovation, which is shown as
the reduction of parameter k1 to k2, and that each platform believes that
rival plays the strategies (yi(IC,C)
T , pi(IC,C)
T). Then social welfare in-
creases from WA to WB by a positive direct effect under the market structure
(IC,C)NT . However, social welfare decreases, from WB to WC , by a negative
indirect effect through the change of market structure to (IC, IC). If the
positive direct effect exceeds the negative indirect one as shown in Figure
3.4, the process innovation increases social welfare. However, if this negative
indirect effect exceeds the positive direct one as shown in Figure 3.5, the
process innovation reduces social welfare.
Figure 3.4: Figure 3.5:
In this chapter, we considered the effect of process innovation (the in-
creased efficiency of cost-reducing investment) on social welfare in a two-sided
market model which endogenizes the determination of compatibility struc-
ture between platforms. While process innovation directly confers socially
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benefits, we have shown that it might nevertheless reduce social welfare by
inducing change of market structure. Therefore, subsidies for cost-reducing
investment may reduce social welfare. Indeed, attaining a first-best might
actually require taxing investment, to prevent the platforms from choosing
inefficient market structures.
There is a limitation in assuming that the content price is exogenously
given. But even if we apply the model of Church and Gandal (2000) and
allow the determination of content price ρij by the content provider, our
main insights from the baseline model also hold. The intuition behind this
is as follows. Suppose that the market structure is asymmetric in which one
platform selects compatibility (C) with the other’s content, while the other
platform selects incompatibility (IC). It can be easily seen that the price of
content supplied for the rival’s hardware is decreased by price competition
between content providers. As a result, since royalties from the sale of content
will be decreased, the platform which selected compatibility has a heightened
incentive to deviate to select incompatibility. Therefore, when we relax the
assumption that content price is exogenously given, process innovation has
a greater potential of leading to an inefficient market structure (IC, IC) and
having a negative impact on social welfare. However, our model ignores some
of the main features in two-sided markets, such as the coordination problem
between the two sides of the market (Caillaud and Jullien, 2003), and the
platforms’ contracting possibilities (Armstrong, 2006; Weyl, 2010), which
may affect the results. The more complete analysis of the determination of
content prices and royalties remains for future work.
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3.8 Appendix
1. Proof of Lemma 3.1.
0 < Di < 1 (i = 1, 2)
⇐⇒
3k(b+ rρ)
2(9kt− 1)
<
1
2
⇐⇒ k >
1
3(3t− b− rρ)
≡ kˆ > 0
2. Proof of Lemma 3.2. The platform 1 chooses the price that leads to
the tipping by its own (D1 = 1) when the profit function can be drawn
as shown in Figure 3.6.
Figure 3.6: Platform 1’s profit function
The condition that tipping is a best-response strategy for platform 1 is
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given by:
lim
p1→(b−t+p2)+0
∂Π1
∂p1
= 1−
b− t+ p2 − c+ y1 + rρ
2t
≤ 0,
⇐⇒ y1 ≥ 3t− b− rρ+ c− p2. (3.1)
Then the best response function of platform1 can be written as
BR1(p2) = b− t+ p2.
Similarly, the platform 2 accepts the price that leads to tipping by rival
platform (D1 = 1) when the profit function of platform 2 is shown in
Figure 3.7.
Figure 3.7: Platform 2’s profit function
The condition that being tipped is a best-response strategy for platform
2 is given by:
lim
p2→(−b+t+p1)−0
∂Π2
∂p2
= −
−b+ t+ p1 − c+ y2
2t
≥ 0,
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⇐⇒ y2 ≤ b− t+ c− p1. (3.2)
Then the best response function of platform 2 can be written as
BR2(p1) = {p2|p2 ≥ −b+ t+ p1}.
Here, when there exists an equilibrium with tipping, the profit of plat-
form 2 can be written as Π2 = rρ−ky
2
2. Therefore, we can immediately
get the following investment level of platform 2:
y2(IC,C)
T = 0.
From this investment level, we can rewrite the condition (3.2) as follows:
p1 ≤ b− t+ c. (3.3)
Therefore we have the line p2 = −b + t + p1 (p1 ≤ b − t + c) as the
set of common point of both platforms’ best response functions. So we
cannot derive the unique equilibrium.
However, using the trembling hand perfect equilibrium as equilibrium
concept, we have the following unique equilibrium:
p1 = b− t+ c , p2 = c.
Because, if platform 2 set the price below marginal cost, p2 < c, and
platform 1 accidentally set the slightly higher price than the best re-
sponse one, then consumer who locates on x ∈ [1− ', 1] buys hardware
device 2 and platform 2 incurs some losses from the revenue of hard-
ware device.
The profit of platform 1 can be written as Π1 = b− t+ y1 + rρ− ky
2
1.
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Figure 3.8: Firms’ best response functions
Taking the first-order conditions and solve for the investment level, we
can derive the following investment level:
∂Π
∂y1
= 1− 2by1 = 0 ⇐⇒ y1(IC,C)
T =
1
2k
.
Using this, we can get the equilibrium prices, demands, profits of plat-
form and content provider, consumer surplus, and social surplus as
shown in Table 3.1.
There exists a corner solution when p1(IC,C)
T, p2(IC,C)
T, y1(IC,C)
T,
and y2(IC,C)
T satisfy the equation (3.1) and (3.3). We can check that
the equation (3.3) is obviously satisfied. So we can derive the condition
for the existence of this corner solution by substituting the equilibrium
value (y1(IC,C)
T = 1/(2k) and p2(IC,C)
T = c) into equation (3.1):
83
y1(IC,C)
T > 3t− b− rρ+ c− p2(IC,C)
T. This implies that
1
2k
> 3t− b− rρ ⇐⇒ k <
1
2(3t− b− rρ)
≡ k.
Finally, given that platform 1 chooses y1(IC,C)
T = 1
2k
and p1(IC,C)
T =
c− t+b, we need to confirm that platform 2 has no incentive to deviate
from the equilibrium strategies, y2(IC,C)
T = 0 and p2(IC,C)
T = c.
Suppose that platform 2 chooses different investment level, yˆ2 > 0.
Equation (3.2) does not hold. That is, platform 2 can get a strictly
positive hardware demand. We can rewrite platform 2’s profit function
as follows.
Π2 = (p2 − c+ yˆ2) ·
−b+ t+ p1(IC,C)
T − p2
2t
+ rρ− kyˆ22
= (p2 − c+ yˆ2) ·
c− p2
2t
+ rρ− kyˆ22
Taking the first-order condition for profit maximization with respect to
price and solving for price yield
∂Π2
∂p2
= 0 ⇐⇒ p2 = c−
yˆ2
2
.
Using this price, we can derive platform 2’s profit,
yˆ2
2
8t
+ rρ− kyˆ22. Dif-
ferentiating this profit with respect to yˆ2 yields
∂Π2
∂yˆ2
=
yˆ2
4t
− 2kyˆ2,
=
(
1
4t
− 2k
)
yˆ2.
When it holds that k > 1
8t
, it is easy to show that ∂Π2
∂yˆ2
< 0 and thus
platform 2 has no incentive to deviate from the equilibrium strategies.
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3. Proof of Proposition 3.1
First,
y1(IC,C)
NT − yi(C,C) =
3k(3t+ b+ rρ)− 1
6k(9kt− 1)
−
1
6k
=
b+ rρ
2(9kt− 1)
> 0,
⇐⇒ y1(IC,C)
NT > yi(C,C).
Next,
yi(IC, IC)− y2(IC,C)
NT =
1
6k
−
3k(3t− b− rρ)− 1
6k(9kt− 1)
=
3k(b+ rρ)
2(9kt− 1)
> 0,
⇐⇒ yi(C,C) > y2(IC,C)
NT.
4. Proof of Proposition 3.2
First, it is obvious that pi(IC, IC) < pi(C,C). Next,
p1(IC,C)
NT − pi(C,C) = pi(IC, IC)− p2(IC,C)
NT
=
b
3
−
2
3
rρ−
b+ rρ
6(9kt− 1)
=
6kt(b− 2rρ)− (b− rρ)
2(9kt− 1)
>
6 · 1
3t
· t(b− 2rρ)− (b− rρ)
2(9kt− 1)
(if k > kˆ >
1
3t
)
=
b− 3rρ
2(9kt− 1)
> 0 (if b > 3rρ),
⇐⇒ p1(IC,C)
NT > pi(C,C) , pi(IC, IC) > p2(IC,C)
NT.
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5. Proof of Proposition 3.3
We can express consumer surplus as follows:
CS(IC,C)NT =
∫ D1(IC,C)NT
0
(2b− p1(IC,C)
NT − tx)dx
+
∫ 1
D1(IC,C)NT
(b− p2(IC,C)
NT − t(1− x))dx,
CS(IC, IC) =
∫ 1
2
0
(b− p1(IC, IC)− tx)dx+
∫ 1
1
2
(b− p2(IC, IC)− t(1− x))dx.
From Proposition 3.2, we can see that b − p2(IC,C)
NT − t(1 − x) >
b − p2(IC, IC) − t(1 − x). So it is easy to derive that CS(IC,C)
NT >
CS(IC, IC) as shown in Figure 3.9.
Figure 3.9: CS(IC,C)NT and
CS(IC, IC)
Figure 3.10: CS(IC,C)NT and
CS(C,C)
Next,
CS(C,C) =
∫ 1
2
0
(2b− p1(C,C)− tx)dx+
∫ 1
1
2
(2b− p2(C,C)− t(1− x))dx,
CS(IC,C)NT =
∫ Di(IC,C)NT
0
(2b− p1(IC,C)
NT − tx)dx
+
∫ 1
Di(IC,C)NT
(b− p2(IC,C)
NT − t(1− x))dx.
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Here we can confirm the following two inequalities:
(
2b− p2(C,C)− t(1− x)
)
−
(
b− p2(IC,C)
NT − t(1− x)
)
=
2(2b− rρ)
3
+
b+ rρ
6(9kt− 1)
> 0,
and
(
2b− p1(C,C)− tx
)
−
(
2b− p1(IC,C)
NT − tx
)
= p1(IC,C)
NT − p1(C,C) > 0, (Proposition 3.2).
Therefore, it is easy to see that CS(C,C) > CS(IC,C)NT as shown in
Figure 3.10. Then, we can derive that CS(IC, IC) < CS(IC,C)NT =
CS(C, IC)NT < CS(C,C).
6. Proof of Proposition 3.4
First of all, it is obvious that CS(IC, IC) < CS(IC,C)NT = CS(C, IC)NT
from Proposition 3.3. Next,
∑
i
Πi(IC,C)
NT −
∑
i
Πi(IC, IC)
=
( t
2
−
1
36k
)[{
1 +
3k(b+ rρ)
9kt− 1
}2
+
{
1−
3k(b+ rρ)
9kt− 1
}2
− 2
]
+ rρ
= 2
( t
2
−
1
36k
){3k(b+ rρ)
9kt− 1
}2
+ rρ > 0,
⇐⇒
∑
i
Πi(IC,C)
NT >
∑
i
Πi(IC, IC),
and
∑
i
pii(IC,C)
NT −
∑
i
pii(IC, IC)
=
[
(1− r)ρ ·D1(IC,C)
NT + (1− r)ρ
]
−
[(1− r)ρ
2
+
(1− r)ρ
2
]
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= (1− r)ρ ·
[3k(b+ rρ)
2(9kt− 1)
+
1
2
]
> 0,
⇐⇒
∑
i
pii(IC,C)
NT >
∑
i
pii(IC, IC).
Therefore, social surplus is expressed as SS = CS +
∑
i Πi +
∑
i pii, we
can show that SS(IC, IC) < SS(IC,C)NT = SS(C, IC)NT.
7. Proof of Proposition 3.6
From Table 3.1,
SS(IC,C)T − SS(IC, IC)
=
(
2(b+ ρ) +
1
4k
−
t
2
− c
)
−
(
b+ ρ+
1
9k
−
t
4
− c
)
= b+ ρ+
1
4k
−
1
9k
−
t
2
+
t
4
= b+ ρ+
5
36k
−
t
4
> b+ ρ+
5
36k
−
1
4
·
b+ rρ
2
(t <
b+ rρ
2
)
> b+ ρ+
5
36k
−
1
4
·
b+ ρ
2
(r < 1)
=
7
8
(b+ ρ) +
5
36k
> 0.
8. Proof of Lemma 3.3
Π1(C, IC)
NT − Π1(IC, IC)
=
( t
2
−
1
36k
)(3k(3t− b− rρ)− 1
9kt− 1
)2
+ rρ−
( t
2
−
1
36k
)
= rρ−
18kt− 1
12
·
(b+ rρ){2(9kt− 1)− 3k(b+ rρ)}
(9kt− 1)2
.
Here, we define ∆− as
∆− ≡
18kt− 1
12
·
(b+ rρ){2(9kt− 1)− 3k(b+ rρ)}
(9kt− 1)2
.
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Therefore,
∂∆−
∂k
= −
b+ rρ
4(9kt− 1)3
{27kt(2t− b− rρ)− (6t− b− rρ)} > 0 (if t <
b+ rρ
2
),
lim
k→∞
∆− = lim
k→∞
(b+ rρ)
(
18t− 1
k
)
{2
(
9t− 1
k
)
− 3(b+ rρ)}
12
(
9t− 1
k
)2
=
(b+ rρ)(6t− b− rρ)
18t
≡ max
k
∆−.
In addition,
rρ−max
k
∆− =
18trρ− (b+ rρ)(6t− b− rρ)
18t
=
1
18t
(
(b+ rρ)2 − 6t(b− 3rρ)
)
>
1
18t
(
(b+ rρ)2 − 6 ·
b+ rρ
2
· (b− 3rρ)
)
(if t <
b+ rρ
2
)
=
b+ rρ
18t
(
(b+ rρ)− 3(b− 3rρ)
)
=
b+ rρ
18t
(−2b+ 10rρ) > 0 (if b < 5rρ).
Then, for all k > kˆ, it holds that rρ > ∆−. Hence Π1(C, IC)
NT >
Π1(IC, IC) holds.
9. Proof of Lemma 3.4
Π1(C,C)− Π1(IC,C)
NT
=
( t
2
+ rρ−
1
36k
)
−
( t
2
−
1
36k
)(3k(3t+ b+ rρ)− 1
9kt− 1
)2
= rρ−
18kt− 1
12
·
(b+ rρ){2(9kt− 1) + 3k(b+ rρ)}
(9kt− 1)2
.
Here, we define ∆+ as
∆+ ≡
18kt− 1
12
·
(b+ rρ){2(9kt− 1) + 3k(b+ rρ)}
(9kt− 1)2
.
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Therefore,
∂∆+
∂k
= −
b+ rρ
4(9kt− 1)3
{6t(9kt− 1) + (b+ rρ)(27kt− 1)} < 0 (if k > kˆ),
lim
k→∞
∆+ = lim
k→∞
(b+ rρ)
(
18t− 1
k
)
{2
(
9t− 1
k
)
+ 3(b+ rρ)}
12
(
9t− 1
k
)2
=
(b+ rρ)(6t+ b+ rρ)
18t
≡ min
k
∆+.
In addition,
rρ−min
k
∆+ =
18trρ− (b+ rρ)(6t+ b+ rρ)
18t
= −
(b+ rρ)2 + 6t(b− 2rρ)
18t
< 0 (if b > 2rρ).
Then, for all k > kˆ, it holds that rρ < ∆+. Hence Π1(C,C) <
Π1(IC,C)
NT holds.
10. Proof of Lemma 3.5
Π1(IC,C)
T − Π1(C,C) =
( 1
4k
− t+ b+ rρ
)
−
( t
2
+ rρ−
1
36k
)
=
5
18k
−
3
2
t+ b
>
5
18 · 1
2(3t−b−rρ)
−
3
2
t+ b (if k < k)
=
t
6
+
4
9
b−
5
9
rρ
>
1
6
·
b+ rρ
3
+
4
9
b−
5
9
rρ (if t >
b+ rρ
3
)
=
b− rρ
2
> 0 (if b > rρ).
11. Proof of Lemma 3.6
First, from Π1(IC, IC) =
t
2
− 1
36k
, Π1(C, IC)
T = rρ, it doesn’t hold
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that Π1(IC, IC) > Π1(C, IC)
T unless the t > 2rρ holds. When it holds
that t > 2rρ, we can derive the following condition of the parameter k
for Π1(IC, IC) > Π1(C, IC)
T.
Π1(IC, IC)− Π1(C, IC)
T =
( t
2
−
1
36k
)
− rρ > 0
⇐⇒ k >
1
18(t− 2rρ)
≡ k˜.
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Table 3.1: Equilibrium investment, price, demands, profits of platform, profit of content provider, consumer
surplus, and social surplus.
(IC, IC) (C, C) (IC,C)NT (IC,C)T
y1
1
6k
1
6k
3k(3t+b+rρ)−1
6k(9kt−1)
1
2k
y2
1
6k
1
6k
3k(3t−b−rρ)−1
6k(9kt−1)
0
p1 t+ c− rρ−
1
6k
t+ c− 1
6k
t+ c+ b
3
− 2
3
rρ− 1
6k
− b+rρ
6k(9kt−1)
c− t+ b
p2 t+ c− rρ−
1
6k
t+ c− 1
6k
t+ c− b
3
− 1
3
rρ− 1
6k
+ b+rρ
6k(9kt−1)
c
D1
1
2
1
2
1
2
+ 3k(b+rρ)
2(9kt−1)
1
D2
1
2
1
2
1
2
−
3k(b+rρ)
2(9kt−1)
0
Π1
t
2
− 1
36k
t
2
+ rρ− 1
36k
(
t
2
− 1
36k
)(
3k(3t+b+rρ)−1
9kt−1
)2 1
4k
− t+ b+ rρ
Π2
t
2
− 1
36k
t
2
+ rρ− 1
36k
(
t
2
− 1
36k
)(3k(3t−b−rρ)−1
9kt−1
)2
+ rρ rρ
pi1
(1−r)ρ
2
(1− r)ρ (1− r)ρ ·D1(IC,C)
NT (1− r)ρ
pi2
(1−r)ρ
2
(1− r)ρ (1− r)ρ (1− r)ρ
CS 1
6k
+ b− 5
4
t− c+ rρ 1
6k
+ 2b− 5
4
t− c
∫ D1(IC,C)NT
0
u1(x) dx+
∫ 1
D1(IC,C)NT
u2(x) dx b+
t
2
− c
SS 1
9k
+ b− t
4
− c+ ρ 1
9k
+ 2b− t
4
− c+ 2ρ CS(IC,C)NT +
∑
i Πi(IC,C)
NT +
∑
i pii(IC,C)
NT 1
4k
− t
2
+ 2(b+ ρ)− c
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Chapter 4
High Profitability of
Low-Quality Firms in
Two-Sided Markets
4.1 Introduction
In the hardware/software systems industry, in which various platforms pro-
duce hardware devices and independent programmers develop software for
these devices, we can easily discern a quality gap between platforms (e.g.,
Sony’s PlayStation 3 vs. Nintendo’s Wii; Apple’s iPad vs. Amazon’s Kin-
dle). Conventional wisdom argues that firms choose these different qualities
to avoid fierce price competition (Mussa and Rosen, 1978; Gabszewicz and
Thisse, 1979). It is well known that higher-quality firms have an advantage
in competition, unless higher-quality products require greater costs to pro-
duce. For example, Shaked and Sutton (1982) show that a higher-quality
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firm may be more profitable than its rival when the level of quality does
not depend on production costs. Conversely, Wang (2003) suggests that if
the variable cost function increases with quality, the higher-quality firm does
not necessarily enjoy greater profit than its lower-quality rival. The fail-
ure of higher-quality firms occurs frequently in two-sided hardware/software
systems markets. The purpose of this chapter is to better understand the
relationship between platform quality and profitability in such markets.
In two-sided markets literature, most studies assume symmetric equilib-
rium pricing (Rochet and Tirole, 2003; Armstrong, 2006). Recently, several
papers employ an asymmetric approach, including the vertical differentia-
tion. Gabszewicz and Wauthy (2014) assume that consumers differ in their
valuation of the indirect network externalities, and show that platform com-
petition induces a vertical differentiation structure, despite the fact that the
ex ante settings of their model are symmetric. Belleflamme and Peitz (2010)
consider that the sellers’ investment raises their net gains from trade. These
two papers regard platform quality as an extension of indirect network ex-
ternalities.
As an alternative, Lin et al. (2011) focus on the quality level of products
and investigate how this affects the optimal pricing strategies. This chapter
differs in the following two respects from their model. First, we consider a
situation where platforms choose the qualities of their devices while focusing
on the quality choices by sellers. Second, unlike this analysis, the utility
of consumers does not depend on the number of sellers. We assume that
consumers benefit from the large variety of software developers (indirect net-
work externalities). Njoroge et al. (2013) is relevant to this chapter because
they argue that platforms choose the qualities of their devices. They show
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that platform investment in quality increases the profit of software develop-
ers. However, they did not assume that the development cost of software
increased with hardware quality. In hardware/software system industries,
high-quality hardware devices tend to increase the development cost for soft-
ware (Corts and Lederman, 2009). Thus, we consider the platforms’ quality
choice in the situation where the development cost of software increases with
hardware quality.
This chapter also relates to the literature on two-sided pricing theory,
in which many existing studies examine the pricing mechanism (Armstrong,
2006; Weyl, 2010). In the hardware/software system industry, royalty fees are
more common than lump-sum fees as the prevailing fee structure for software
developers. Most empirical (Corts and Lederman, 2009; Dube´ et al., 2010)
and theoretical (Hagiu, 2006, 2009) studies assume this type of fee structure.
In addition, we consider a sequential-move game in which software developers
decide upon their chosen platform before users as in Hagiu (2006). That is,
platforms decide their royalty rates (for software developers) before setting
their hardware prices (for consumers).
In this chapter, after analyzing the model that includes these real-world
examples, we derive the following two results. First, we show the poten-
tial higher profitability of the lower-quality platform under the parameter
range in which the extent of the indirect network externalities is relatively
large compared with the quality of the hardware device. The intuition is
as follows. The high-quality hardware device tends to decrease the range of
software developed for the device. However, given indirect network external-
ities, consumers prefer a platform with a large variety of software. Therefore,
when the advantage of software variety dominates the disadvantage of low
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hardware quality, the lower-quality platform has the opportunity to enjoy
greater profit than does its higher-quality rival.
Second, we demonstrate that, in a sequential-move game, platforms select
the same royalty rate in equilibrium, even with quality asymmetries across
the hardware devices. The intuition is as follows. If a given platform selects
a higher royalty rate than its rival, it may reduce the variety of software
developed, which will then decrease its advantage in the final stage (where
it determines the price for the device). Therefore, both platforms have no
incentive to set a higher royalty rate and therefore both will choose the same
royalty rate.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 intro-
duces the model. Section 4.3 characterizes the equilibrium of this model.
Section 4.4 provides a profit comparison between higher- and lower-quality
platforms, where we show that the lower-quality platform can enjoy greater
profit than its higher-quality rival in at least some parameter space. Section
4.5 concludes the chapter by providing directions for further research.
4.2 Model
There are two platforms, i = 1, 2. Each platform provides a hardware device
i at a price pi and enables the interaction between consumers and software
developers “on board”. Denote by b the utility any consumer derives from a
unit of software, which is assumed to be the same for all consumers. Similarly,
denote by pi the revenue that any software developer earns from a unit mass of
consumers, which is also assumed to be the same for all software developers.
For simplicity, we assume that the extents of indirect network externalities,
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b and pi, are exogenous parameters.1 Consumers need to purchase a device
to use the software. Platform i decides the quality qi and price pi of its
devices. Without loss of generality, we suppose that platform 1 produces
lower-quality hardware device qL while platform 2 produces higher-quality
one qH . In addition, platform i sets a royalty rate ri (0 ≤ ri ≤ 1) for software
developers. Each of the software developers then needs to pay a fraction ri
of its software revenue to the platform. Therefore, the profit function of
platform i is given by
Πi = piDi + ripiDi · ni = (pi + ripini)Di,
where Di denotes the demand for device i and ni denotes the number of
software products developed for device i.
Suppose now that software developers for the higher-quality platform
incur higher development costs in producing their software. We assume that
software developers are heterogeneous in terms of cost efficiency, which is
denoted by cj and uniformly distributed between zero and infinity with a
unit density.2 A software developer with a smaller cj can develop software
at a lower fixed cost. In this analysis, we assume that the fixed cost of
developers is given by cjqi. Thus, the profit that a software developer j gains
from developing a software product for device i is given by
1Following Caillaud and Jullien (2003), we can also interpret this as meaning that the
total gross gain from trade between a consumer and a software developer is b+pi, where the
allocation is negotiated as a function of their bargaining power. We assume that because
of bargaining, the consumer receives b and the software developer earns pi.
2Following Katz and Shapiro (1985), we assume that the parameter cj has no finite
upper limit to avoid the need to consider corner solutions.
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piij = (1− ri)piDi − cjqi
Each developer can develop software for either platform, and independently
decides whether to develop for each platform. Therefore, the profit of soft-
ware developer j is given by pij =
∑
i piij.
Consumers are also heterogeneous in taste regarding their preferred hard-
ware quality level, which is denoted by θ and distributed on the interval [0, 1]
with a unit density. We suppose that the utility to a consumer with a quality
preference θ from a device i is given by θqi. In addition, consumers benefit
(in terms of utility) not only from the device they own but also from the
variety of software available for the device. Thus, the utility function of a
consumer with preference θ who purchases device i and its available software
is written as
ui(θ) = bni + θqi − pi.
Here, we assume the following decision rule for consumers. Each consumer
purchases only one device. If the consumer obtains the same utility from
both devices, the consumer purchases the device with the larger range of
software. All else being equal, the consumer chooses device i with probability
αi > 0 (
∑
i αi = 1). We consider a two-stage game with the following timing.
1. Each platform i sets the royalty rate (ri). Software developers then
independently decide whether to develop software for platform i.
2. Each platform i sets a hardware price (pi). Consumers then purchase
one device and its available software.
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4.3 Equilibrium
4.3.1 Stage 2: Optimal price for devices
Platform 2 produces the higher-quality device, (q1, q2) = (qL, qH). The type
of consumer that is indifferent between device 1 and 2 can be characterized
by
u1 = u2 ⇐⇒ θ =
b(n1 − n2)− p1 + p2
qH − qL
≡ θˆ.
We can now derive the demand functions for device i,⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
D1 = θˆ =
b(n1−n2)−p1+p2
qH−qL
,
D2 = 1− θˆ = 1−
b(n1−n2)−p1+p2
qH−qL
,
and the profit functions,
Π1 = (p1 + r1pin1)
b(n1 − n2)− p1 + p2
qH − qL
,
Π2 = (p2 + r2pin2)
qH − qL − b(n1 − n2) + p1 − p2
qH − qL
.
Taking the first-order conditions and solving for prices, we have the following
prices.
p˜1 =
qH − qL + b(n1 − n2)− 2r1pin1 − r2pin2
3
p˜2 =
2(qH − qL) + b(n2 − n1)− r1pin1 − 2r2pin2
3
We rewrite these demands and profits as follows.
D˜1 =
qH − qL + b(n1 − n2) + r1pin1 − r2pin2
3(qH − qL)
D˜2 =
2(qH − qL) + b(n2 − n1)− r1pin1 + r2pin2
3(qH − qL)
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Π˜1 =
{qH − qL + b(n1 − n2) + r1pin1 − r2pin2}
2
9(qH − qL)
Π˜2 =
{2(qH − qL) + b(n2 − n1)− r1pin1 + r2pin2}
2
9(qH − qL)
4.3.2 Stage 1: Optimal royalty rate for software devel-
opers
In Stage 1, content providers rationally forecast consumer demand Di = D˜i
for Stage 2 and make their decisions about whether to develop software for
each device. We use this to calculate the marginal type of software developer
that is indifferent between developing software for device i and not.
piij = (1− ri)piD˜i − cjqi ≥ 0
⇐⇒ cj <
(1− ri)piD˜i
qi
= ni (i = 1, 2) (4.1)
Solving these equations (i = 1, 2), we derive the range of software developed
for device i as follows.⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
nˆ1 =
(1−r1)pi{qH(qH−qL)−(1−r2)pi(b+r2pi)}
3qLqH(qH−qL)−(1−r2)pi(b+r2pi)qL−(1−r1)pi(b+r1pi)qH
nˆ2 =
(1−r2)pi{2qL(qH−qL)−(1−r1)pi(b+r1pi)}
3qLqH(qH−qL)−(1−r2)pi(b+r2pi)qL−(1−r1)pi(b+r1pi)qH
(4.2)
Substituting this range of software (nˆ1, nˆ2) in (Π˜1, Π˜2), we have
Πˆ1 = Π˜1(nˆ1, nˆ2)
=
{qH − qL + b(nˆ1 − nˆ2) + r1pinˆ1 − r2pinˆ2}
2
9(qH − qL)
,
Πˆ2 = Π˜2(nˆ1, nˆ2)
=
{2(qH − qL) + b(nˆ2 − nˆ1)− r1pinˆ1 + r2pinˆ2}
2
9(qH − qL)
.
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We rewrite the first-order condition for platform 1’s profit maximization as
follows.
∂Πˆ1
∂r1
=
2{qH − qL + b(nˆ1 − nˆ2) + r1pinˆ1 − r2pinˆ2}
9(qH − qL)
×
∂[(b+ r1pi)nˆ1 − (b+ r2pi)nˆ2]
∂r1
= 0
It holds that qH − qL + b(nˆ1 − nˆ2) + r1pinˆ1 − r2pinˆ2 > 0, given that we
analyze the interior solution, D˜i ∈ (0, 1). Given the need to satisfy the first-
order condition such that {∂[(b+ r1pi)nˆ1 − (b+ r2pi)nˆ2]} /∂r1 = 0, we can
similarly analyze platform 2. Accordingly, we rewrite the platforms’ profit
maximization problems as
∂Πˆi
∂ri
= 0 ⇐⇒
∂[(b+ ripi)nˆi − (b+ rjpi)nˆj]
∂ri
= 0. (4.3)
That is, platform i maximizes b(nˆi− nˆj)+ripinˆi−rjpinˆj with respect to ri for
profit maximization. This expresses the advantage the platform can derive
if it marginally increases the number of content providers for its device. The
first term, b(ni−nj), indicates the difference in indirect network externalities.
In two-sided markets, the profit-maximizing price is adjusted downward by
the external benefit to the other group (Armstrong, 2006). The second and
third terms, ripinˆi − rjpinˆj, indicates the difference in such reduced prices
between the two platforms. Next, by rewriting equation (4.1) with i = 1, we
derive the following equation.
(1− r1)piD˜1(nˆ1, nˆ2) = nˆ1qL
⇐⇒ (1− r1)pi ·
qH − qL + b(nˆ1 − nˆ2) + r1pinˆ1 − r2pinˆ2
3(qH − qL)
= nˆ1qL
⇐⇒ (b+ r1pi)nˆ1 − (b+ r2pi)nˆ2 =
3qL(qH − qL)nˆ1
pi(1− r1)
− (qH − qL)
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Taking the partial derivative of both sides with respect to r1, we derive the
following equation.
∂[(b+ r1pi)nˆ1 − (b+ r2pi)nˆ2]
∂r1
=
3qL(qH − qL)
pi
·
∂
∂r1
[
nˆ1
1− r1
]
We can similarly calculate this for platform 2, and summarize the result as
follows.
∂[(b+ ripi)nˆi − (b+ rjpi)nˆj]
∂ri
= 0 ⇐⇒
∂
∂ri
[
nˆi
1− ri
]
= 0 (4.4)
Here, by using equation (4.2), we can derive the following equation.
nˆ1
1− r1
=
pi{qH(qH − qL)− (1− r2)pi(b+ r2pi)}
3qLqH(qH − qL)− (1− r2)pi(b+ r2pi)qL − (1− r1)pi(b+ r1pi)qH
The maximization of nˆ1/(1 − r1) is replaced by the maximization of (1 −
r1)(b+ r1pi). This means that platform 1’s optimal decision about its royalty
rate is unaffected by any of the strategies of its rival. This result also holds
for platform 2. Thus, we rearrange the first-order conditions as follows.
∂
∂ri
[
nˆi
1− ri
]
= 0 ⇐⇒
∂[(1− ri)(b+ ripi)]
∂ri
= 0 (4.5)
From equations (4.3), (4.4), and (4.5), we summarize the platforms’ first-
order conditions for profit maximization and obtain the equilibrium royalty
rates r∗i as follows.
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∂Πˆi
∂ri
= 0 ⇐⇒
∂[(1− ri)(b+ ripi)]
∂ri
= 0 ⇐⇒ r∗i =
pi − b
2pi
This result has two interesting aspects. First, equilibrium royalty rates
do not depend on the quality of the device, as both platforms make their
decisions to maximize the indirect network externalities. Therefore, the equi-
librium royalty rates depend only on two parameters reflecting the degree of
the indirect network externalities. This equilibrium results from the same
mechanism in the case where both platforms produce devices of the same
quality.
Second, the equilibrium royalty rate chosen by the higher-quality platform
equals that chosen by its lower-quality rival, despite the fact that platform 2
produces a higher-quality device than platform 1. The intuition behind this
result is as follows. Platform 1, which produces a lower-quality device, has
no incentive to set a higher royalty rate than platform 2. On the other hand,
if platform 2, which produces a higher-quality device, sets a higher royalty
rate than its rival, it cannot use the higher quality to its best advantage, as
setting the higher royalty rate decreases the number of software developers
for its device, which prevents it from effectively internalizing the indirect
network externalities. Therefore, the platforms set the same royalty rate.3
These equilibrium royalties satisfy the second-order condition (see the
Appendix for the proof). Using this result, we derive other equilibrium values
as follows.
3In the video game industry, software developers are charged about $7–8 as a royalty
fee by Nintendo, Sony or Microsoft, even though there is little difference in the price of
the game titles across these video game console manufacturers.
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Proposition 4.1. Suppose that platform 1 produces a lower-quality hard-
ware device and platform 2 produces a higher-quality device. If the quality is
sufficiently high to satisfy the condition
qH > max
{
qL +
√
q2L + (b+ pi)
2
2
≡ fL(qL), qL +
(b+ pi)2
8qL
≡ fH(qL)
}
,(4.6)
we derive the interior equilibrium royalty rates, device prices, number of soft-
ware developers, consumer demand for each device, and platform profits as
follows.
r∗1 =
pi − b
2pi
r∗2 =
pi − b
2pi
p∗1 =
{4qL(qH − qL) + b
2 − pi2}{4qH(qH − qL)− (b+ pi)
2}
4{12qLqH(qH − qL)− (b+ pi)2(qL + qH)}
p∗2 =
{4qH(qH − qL) + b
2 − pi2}{8qL(qH − qL)− (b+ pi)
2}
4{12qLqH(qH − qL)− (b+ pi)2(qL + qH)}
n∗1 =
(b+ pi){4qH(qH − qL)− (b+ pi)
2}
2{12qLqH(qH − qL)− (b+ pi)2(qL + qH)}
n∗2 =
(b+ pi){8qL(qH − qL)− (b+ pi)
2}
2{12qLqH(qH − qL)− (b+ pi)2(qL + qH)}
D∗1 =
qL{4qH(qH − qL)− (b+ pi)
2}
12qLqH(qH − qL)− (b+ pi)2(qL + qH)
D∗2 =
qH{8qL(qH − qL)− (b+ pi)
2}
12qLqH(qH − qL)− (b+ pi)2(qL + qH)
Π
∗
1 =
q2L(qH − qL){4qH(qH − qL)− (b+ pi)
2}2
{12qLqH(qH − qL)− (b+ pi)2(qL + qH)}2
Π
∗
2 =
q2H(qH − qL){8qL(qH − qL)− (b+ pi)
2}2
{12qLqH(qH − qL)− (b+ pi)2(qL + qH)}2
Proof. See the Appendix.
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4.4 Profit comparison
We now compare profits between the higher- and lower-quality platforms.
From this comparison, we derive the following proposition.
Proposition 4.2. If inequality (4.6) and qH < (b+ pi)
2/(4qL) ≡ f(qL) hold,
a lower-quality platform can earn more profit than a higher-quality platform.
The parameter space that satisfies these conditions is shown in Figure 4.1.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Figure 4.1: Lower-quality platform enjoys greater profit.
Proposition 4.2 shows that even with some difference in hardware quality,
the lower-quality device has a larger range of software, and this software su-
periority may dominate its disadvantage in hardware quality. However, if the
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quality difference is larger than the extent of the indirect network external-
ities, only the quality of the device affects consumers’ decisions. Therefore,
a lower-quality platform can derive more profit than its higher-quality rival
only when the product of qualities qL · qH is not sufficiently large compared
with the degree of indirect network externalities, 4qL · qH < (b+ pi)
2.
4.5 Conclusion
This chapter investigated the competition between vertically differentiated
platforms in two-sided markets. We derived a result that is counterintuitive
to conventional wisdom. In two-sided markets, the lower-quality platform
may be able to gain more profit than its higher-quality rival. The intuition
behind this result is as follows. The higher quality of the device implies
that the software developers incur higher development costs, which in turn
decreases the number of software developers. This reduction in software vari-
ety decreases the platform’s utility to consumers through the indirect network
externalities. Therefore, when the advantage of software variety dominates
the disadvantage of low hardware quality, the lower-quality platform has the
opportunity to enjoy greater profit than its rival.
This chapter also contributes to the two-sided pricing literature by sug-
gesting an interesting mechanism by which asymmetric platforms may still
choose symmetric strategies. When platforms decide their royalty rates be-
fore setting their hardware prices, they choose the same royalty rate in equi-
librium even if there are asymmetries in the quality of the devices they pro-
duce. This result depends on the platform fee structure we adopt. Under a
royalty fee structure, the increase (decrease) in the number of software devel-
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opers increases (decreases) the number of consumers. However, it also raises
(lowers) the payments from software developers to the platform. Therefore,
when compared with a lump-sum fee, the platform royalty decision strongly
affects, via the indirect network externalities, the decision made in the subse-
quent stage. Hence, platforms have no incentive to employ a royalty rate that
differs from the rival. Further analysis of the robustness of these symmetric
strategies remains a task for future work.
In our model, we made a few simplifying assumptions. One of these is
that we regard the benefits consumers gain from software as independent
of the hardware quality. We also assume that platforms choose their hard-
ware quality level from only two alternatives, high and low. Changing these
assumptions is a potentially fruitful direction for future research.
4.6 Appendix
1. Proof of the second-order condition.
∂2Πˆ1
∂r21
= −
16pi2q2LqH(qH − qL){4qH(qH − qL)− (b+ pi)
2}2
{12qLqH(qH − qL)− (b+ pi)2(qL + qH)2}3
< 0
∂2Πˆ2
∂r22
= −
16pi2qLq
2
H(qH − qL){8qL(qH − qL)− (b+ pi)
2}2
{12qLqH(qH − qL)− (b+ pi)2(qL + qH)2}3
< 0
2. Proof of Proposition 4.1.
If 4qH(qH − qL) − (b + pi)
2 > 0 and 8qL(qH − qL) − (b + pi)
2 > 0 hold,
both platforms can attract a positive number of software developers
and consumers and earn a positive profit (n∗i > 0, 0 < D
∗
i < 1, Π
∗
i > 0
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for i = 1, 2). Solving these inequalities for qH(> 0) yields
4qH(qH − qL)− (b+ pi)
2 > 0
⇐⇒ qH >
qL +
√
q2L + (b+ pi)
2
2
≡ fL(qL),
8qL(qH − qL)− (b+ pi)
2 > 0
⇐⇒ qH > qL +
(b+ pi)2
8qL
≡ fH(qL).
Thus, a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of an inner
solution is given by qH > max {fL(qL), fH(qL)}.
3. Proof of Proposition 4.2.
Π
∗
1 − Π
∗
2
=
qH − qL
{12qLqH(qH − qL)− (b+ pi)2(qL + qH)}2
·
[
q2L{4qH(qH − qL)− (b+ pi)
2}2 − q2H{8qL(qH − qL)− (b+ pi)
2}2
]
=
qH − qL
{12qLqH(qH − qL)− (b+ pi)2(qL + qH)}2
·
[
qL{4qH(qH − qL)− (b+ pi)
2}+ qH{8qL(qH − qL)− (b+ pi)
2}
]
·
[
qL{4qH(qH − qL)− (b+ pi)
2}− qH{8qL(qH − qL)− (b+ pi)
2}
]
=
(qH − qL)
2{(b+ pi)2 − 4qLqH}
{12qLqH(qH − qL)− (b+ pi)2(qL + qH)}
> 0
⇐⇒ qL <
(b+ pi)2
4qH
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
This dissertation focused on compatibility and innovation in two-sided mar-
kets. In Chapter 2, we showed how the product life cycle affects the com-
patibility strategy of platforms. At the introductory stage, it is of great
importance to platforms to sell hardware devices to new customers. In such
a situation, compatibility is unprofitable because providing wider availabil-
ity of content across devices increases the attractiveness of rival hardware
devices. Thus, incompatibility is a dominant strategy for platforms. At the
mature stage, almost all customers have purchased an installed base of some
platform, and only want to purchase content for the platform. In this case,
a platform obtains most of its profit by selling content in its marketplace
and obtaining royalties. In such a situation, compatibility is a dominant
strategy. At the intermediate stage, the share of the hardware device market
plays a critical role. With sufficiently large differences in the market share
between competing platforms, the smaller platform gives up increasing its
market share and chooses compatibility to earn more royalty revenue. On
the other hand, the large platform has an incentive to select incompatibil-
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ity for a bigger market share. Without sufficiently large differences in the
market share, there are multiple asymmetric equilibria. The market has the
characteristics of a game of “chicken.” That is, either firm will make more
profit by making its content incompatible with the rival’s hardware device,
given that the rival does the opposite.
In Chapter 3, we showed how process innovation (increased efficiency of
cost-reducing investment for hardware devices) affects the platforms’ com-
patibility decisions. Process innovation changes platforms’ incentives to in-
vest in their hardware devices. The change in investment incentives affects
compatibility decisions. For example, suppose that one platform chooses
incompatibility while the other chooses compatibility. In this case, the plat-
form that chooses incompatibility has a larger market share for the hardware
device from its advantage in terms of software variety. On the other hand, the
platform that chooses compatibility can earn more royalty revenue instead
of increasing its market share. If process innovation occurs, both platforms
can easily invest in cost reductions in their hardware device. The platform
that chooses incompatibility and obtains a greater market share has an in-
centive to monopolize the hardware device market by investing aggressively.
Therefore, the platform that chooses compatibility, changes its compatibility
decisions to prevent it being monopolized by a larger rival. As a result, both
platforms choose incompatibility in equilibrium. These changes in competi-
tive structure have the following three effects. First, the profit of the large
platform that chose incompatibility before process innovation decreases. Sec-
ond, the profit of the small platform that chose compatibility before process
innovation increases conversely. Finally, consumer surplus and social welfare
may decrease.
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In Chapter 4, we focused on the competition between vertically differen-
tiated platforms. Higher-quality increases the utility of consumers directly.
On the other hand, it also increases the fixed development cost of software
developers. This leads to a reduction in the software variety, which reduces
the attractiveness to consumers of high-quality hardware devices. Therefore,
the higher-quality has a positive direct effect and a negative indirect effect
for competition. When the negative indirect effect dominates the positive di-
rect one, the lower-quality platform may be able to gain greater profit than
the higher-quality rival may. We also show that the vertically differentiated
platforms charge the same royalty rate to software developers in equilibrium.
In this dissertation, we focused on investment and innovation only for
hardware devices (consumer side). However, in reality, consumers benefit
not only from the quality of hardware devices, but also from the quality of
software products. The existence of indirect network externalities is one of
the most important features of two-sided markets. However, the previous
literature assumes that users on each side benefit only from the number of
users on the other side. However, users’ benefits depend on the quality of
the users on the other side. Therefore, further analysis of an extension of our
focus in this direction remains a task for future work.
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